64 ideas
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: We can learn from the work of philosophers of other periods only if we are prepared to run the risk of radical and almost inevitable misrepresentation of his thought. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Pref) | |
A reaction: This sounds about right, and a motto for my own approach to Aristotle and Leibniz, but I see the effort as more collaborative than this suggests. Professional specialists in older philosophers are a vital part of the team. Read them! |
20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: A 'necessary' condition for something's being an X is condition that all Xs must satisfy. ...A 'sufficient' condition for something's being an X is a condition that, when satisfied, guarantees that what satisfies it is an X. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: By summarising this I arrive at the requirement/guarantee formulation, which I am rather pleased with. What is required for rain, and what guarantees rain? |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The most productive way in which to attempt an understanding of any philosophical idea is to work on its defence. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.vii) | |
A reaction: Very nice. The key point is that this brings greater understanding than working on attacking an idea, which presumably has the dangers of caricature, straw men etc. It is the Socratic insight that dialectic is the route to wisdom. |
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we specify the 'necessary' conditions that are 'sufficient' for something's being an X, that is a combination of conditions such that all and only Xs meet them, which is the hallmark of a definition of X-hood. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: There are, of course, many other ways to define something, as shown in the 2.D Reason | Definition section of this database. This nicely summarises the classical view. |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Frege gave up on the attempt to introduce natural numbers by contextual definition, but the project has been revived by neo-logicists. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Kit Fine - The Limits of Abstraction II |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the feminist critique, ideologies that operate as tools of political repression are falsely represented as definitions possessing a timeless, natural, asocial, universal objectivity. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this does not just apply to definitions, but to all expressions of ideologically repressive strategy. I'm trying to think of an example of a specifically feminist problem case. Davies doesn't cite anyone. |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: For Wright, an expression refers to an object if it fulfils the 'syntactic role' of a singular term, and if we have fixed the truth-conditions of sentences containing it in such a way that some of them come out true. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.15 | |
A reaction: Much waffle is written about reference, and it is nice to hear of someone actually trying to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for reference to be successful. So is it possible for 'the round square' to ever refer? '...is impossible to draw' |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2 |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naďve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6 |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: In the Fregean view number theory is a science, aimed at those truths furnished by the essential properties of zero and its successors. The two broad question are then the nature of the objects, and the epistemology of those facts. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I pounce on the word 'essence' here (my thing). My first question is about the extent to which the natural numbers all have one generic essence, and the extent to which they are individuals (bless their little cotton socks). |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Someone could be clear about number identities, and distinguish numbers from other things, without conceiving them as ordered in a progression at all. The point of them would be to make comparisons between sizes of groups. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xv) | |
A reaction: Hm. Could you grasp size if you couldn't grasp which of two groups was the bigger? What's the point of noting that I have ten pounds and you only have five, if you don't realise that I have more than you? You could have called them Caesar and Brutus. |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The invitation to number the instances of some non-sortal concept is intelligible only if it is relativised to a sortal. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an essentially Fregean idea, as when we count the boots when we have decided whether they fall under the concept 'boot' or the concept 'pair'. I also take this to be the traditional question 'what units are you using'? |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
Full Idea: Wright is claiming that HP is a special sort of truth in some way: it is supposed to be the fundamental truth about cardinality; ...in particular, HP is supposed to be more fundamental, in some sense than the Dedekind-Peano axioms. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 1 | |
A reaction: Heck notes that although PA can be proved from HP, HP can be proven from PA plus definitions, so direction of proof won't show fundamentality. He adds that Wright thinks HP is 'more illuminating'. |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Informally, Peano's axioms are: 0 is a number, numbers have a successor, different numbers have different successors, 0 isn't a successor, properties of 0 which carry over to successors are properties of all numbers. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Each statement of the famous axioms is slightly different from the others, and I have reworded Wright to fit him in. Since the last one (the 'induction axiom') is about properties, it invites formalization in second-order logic. |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The intuitive proposal is the essential number theoretic truths are precisely the logical consequences of the Peano axioms, ...but the notion of consequence is a semantic one...and it is not obvious that we possess a semantic notion of the requisite kind. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: (Not sure I understand this, but it is his starting point for rejecting PA as the essence of arithmetic). |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: We incline to think of the Peano axioms as truths of some sort; so there has to be a philosophical question how we ought to conceive of the nature of the facts which make those statements true. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He also asks about how we know the truths] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: We teach our children to count, sometimes with no attempt to explain what the sounds mean. Doubtless it is this habit which makes it so natural to think of the number series as fundamental. Frege's insight is that sameness of number is fundamental. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xv) | |
A reaction: 'When do children understand number?' rather than when they can recite numerals. I can't make sense of someone being supposed to understand number without a grasp of which numbers are bigger or smaller. To make 13='15' do I add or subtract? |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Wright says the Fregean arithmetic can be broken down into two steps: first, Hume's Law may be derived from Law V; and then, arithmetic may be derived from Hume's Law without any help from Law V. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Kit Fine - The Limits of Abstraction I.4 | |
A reaction: This sounds odd if Law V is false, but presumably Hume's Law ends up as free-standing. It seems doubtful whether the resulting theory would count as logic. |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Wright proposed removing Frege's basic law V (which led to paradox), replacing it with Frege's 'number principle' (identity of numbers is one-to-one correspondence). The new system is formally consistent, and the Peano axioms can be derived from it. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.7 | |
A reaction: The 'number principle' is also called 'Hume's principle'. This idea of Wright's resurrected the project of logicism. The jury is ought again... Frege himself questioned whether the number principle was a part of logic, which would be bad for 'logicism'. |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
Full Idea: Wright intends the claim that Hume's Principle (HP) embodies an explanation of the concept of number to imply that it is analytic of the concept of cardinal number - so it is an analytic or conceptual truth, much as a definition would be. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 1 | |
A reaction: Boolos is quoted as disagreeing. Wright is claiming a fundamental truth. Boolos says something can fix the character of something (as yellow fixes bananas), but that doesn't make it 'fundamental'. I want to defend 'fundamental'. |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: What is fundamental to possession of any notion of natural number at all is not the knowledge that the numbers may be arrayed in a progression but the knowledge that they are identified and distinguished by reference to 1-1 correlation among concepts. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xv) | |
A reaction: My question is 'what is the essence of number?', and my inclination to disagree with Wright on this point suggests that the essence of number is indeed caught in the Dedekind-Peano axioms. But what of infinite numbers? |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Identifying numbers with extensions will not solve the Caesar problem for numbers unless we have already solved the Caesar problem for extensions. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xiv) |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Number-theoretic platonism is just the thesis that natural number is a sortal concept. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i) | |
A reaction: See Crispin Wright on sortals to expound this. An odd way to express platonism, but he is presenting the Fregean version of it. |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: We may not be able to settle whether some general form of empiricism is correct independently of natural numbers. It might be precisely our grasp of the abstract sortal, natural number, which shows the hypothesis of empiricism to be wrong. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i) | |
A reaction: A nice turning of the tables. In the end only coherence decides these things. You may accept numbers and reject empiricism, and then find you have opened the floodgates for abstracta. Excessive floodgates, or blockages of healthy streams? |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Treating numbers adjectivally is, in effect, treating the numbers as quantifiers. Frege observes that we can always parse out any apparently adjectival use of a number word in terms of substantival use. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iii) | |
A reaction: The immediate response to this is that any substantival use can equally be expressed adjectivally. If you say 'the number of moons of Jupiter is four', I can reply 'oh, you mean Jupiter has four moons'. |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The Peano Axioms are logical consequences of a statement constituting the core of an explanation of the notion of cardinal number. The infinity of cardinal numbers emerges as a consequence of the way cardinal number is explained. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 4.xix) | |
A reaction: This, along with Idea 13896, nicely summarises the neo-logicist project. I tend to favour a strategy which starts from ordering, rather than identities (1-1), but an attraction is that this approach is closer to counting objects in its basics. |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: We shall endeavour to see whether it is possible to follow through the strategy adumbrated in 'Grundlagen' for establishing the Peano Axioms without at any stage invoking classes. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 4.xvi) | |
A reaction: The key idea of neo-logicism. If you can avoid classes entirely, then set theory paradoxes become irrelevant, and classes aren't logic. Philosophers now try to derive the Peano Axioms from all sorts of things. Wright admits infinity is a problem. |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Crispin Wright has reactivated Frege's logistic program, which for decades just about everybody assumed was a lost cause. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by José A. Benardete - Logic and Ontology 3 | |
A reaction: [This opens Bernadete's section called "Back to Strong Logicism?"] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Most would cite Russell's paradox, the non-logical character of the axioms which Russell and Whitehead's reconstruction of Frege's enterprise was constrained to employ, and the incompleteness theorems of Gödel, as decisive for logicism's failure. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Intro) |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The general view is that Russell's Paradox put paid to Frege's logicist attempt, and Russell's own attempt is vitiated by the non-logical character of his axioms (esp. Infinity), and by the incompleteness theorems of Gödel. But these are bad reasons. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 4.xvi) | |
A reaction: Wright's work is the famous modern attempt to reestablish logicism, in the face of these objections. |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: I have the gravest doubts whether any coherent account could be given of any multiplicity of senses of 'exist'. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 2.x) | |
A reaction: I thoroughly agree with this thought. Do water and wind exist in different senses of 'exist'? |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: When a class of terms functions as singular terms, and the sentences are true, then those terms genuinely refer. Being singular terms, their reference is to objects. There is no further question whether they really refer, and there are such objects. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iii) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key sentence, because this whole view is standardly called 'platonic', but it certainly isn't platonism as we know it, Jim. Ontology has become an entirely linguistic matter, but do we then have 'sakes' and 'whereaboutses'? |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1 | |
A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates. |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Wright says we should accord to contextually defined abstract terms a genuine full-blown reference to objects. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.18 | |
A reaction: This is the punch line of Wright's neo-logicist programme. See Idea 9868 for his view of reference. Dummett regards this strong view of contextual definition as 'exorbitant'. Wright's view strikes me as blatantly false. |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The claim that no concept counts as sortal if an instance of it can survive its loss, runs foul of so-called phase sortals like 'embryo' and 'chrysalis'. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i) | |
A reaction: The point being that those items only fall under that sortal for one phase of their career, and of their identity. I've always thought such claims absurd, and this gives a good reason for my view. |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts. |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Before we can conclude that φ expresses a sortal concept, we need to ensure that 'is the same φ as' generates statements of genuine identity rather than of some other equivalence relation. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i) |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: A concept is 'sortal' if it exemplifies a kind of object. ..In English predication of a sortal concept needs an indefinite article ('an' elm). ..What really constitutes the distinction is that it involves grasping identity for things which fall under it. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i) | |
A reaction: This is a key notion, which underlies the claims of 'sortal essentialism' (see David Wiggins). |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: 'Tree' is not a sortal concept under which directions fall since we cannot adequately explain the truth-conditions of any identity statement involving a pair of tree-denoting singular terms by appealing to facts to do with parallelism between lines. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xiv) | |
A reaction: The idea seems to be that these two fall under 'hedgehog', because that is a respect in which they are identical. I like to notion of explanation as a part of this. |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The fact that it seems possible to establish a sortal notion of direction by reference to lines and parallelism, discloses tacit commitments to directions in statements about parallelism...There is incoherence in the idea that a line might lack direction. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 4.xviii) | |
A reaction: This seems like a slippery slope into a very extravagant platonism about concepts. Are concepts like direction as much a part of the natural world as rivers are? What other undiscovered concepts await us? |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: A mild version of the verification principle would say that it makes sense to think of someone as understanding an expression only if he is able, by his use of the expression, to give the best possible evidence that he understands it. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.vii) | |
A reaction: That doesn't seem to tell us what understanding actually consists of, and may just be the truism that to demonstrate anything whatsoever will necessarily involve some evidence. |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: If the appearance of reference can be misleading, why cannot an apparent lack of reference be misleading? | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 2.xi) | |
A reaction: A nice simple thought. Analytic philosophy has concerned itself a lot with sentences that seem to refer, but the reference can be analysed away. For me, this takes the question of reference out of the linguistic sphere, which wasn't Wright's plan. |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The heart of the problem is Frege's assumption that predicates have Bedeutungen at all; and no reason is at present evident why someone who espouses Frege's notion of object is contrained to make that assumption. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iv) | |
A reaction: This seems like a penetrating objection to Frege's view of reference, and presumably supports the Kripke approach. |
20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: It was suggested that aesthetic experience isn't solely perceptual. It's infused by a cognitive but non-conceptual process described by Kant as involving the free play of the imagination and the understanding. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This fits literature very well, painting quite well, and music hardly at all. |
20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: To explain why not everyone who is prepared to encounter a thing's aesthetic properties can recognise them, ...eighteenth century theorists posited the existence of a special faculty of aesthetic perception, that of taste. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: But there seem to be two aspects to taste - first the capacity to enjoy some sorts of art, and second the ability to discriminate the good from the bad. The latter is 'standards' of taste (Hume's title). Do non-musical people lack taste? |
20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: An example of the sublime is the vastness of the night sky. ...It includes negative feelings of insignificance in the face of nature's indifference, power and magnitude, but is positive in that we are capable of comprehending such matters. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The negative part seems to be a very intellectual experience, with close links to religion, and may be the experience that leads to deism (belief in God's indifference). |
20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The first to link the art forms together explicitly and to separate them from other disciplines and activities were the authors of encyclopedias and books in the 1740s and 1750s. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Intriguing that no individual seems to get the credit (or blame). Presumably our modern Aesthetics (applied to art) couldn't exist before this move was made - and yet there is plenty of aesthetic discussion in early Greek philosophy. |
20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The avant-garde art of the twentieth century played a significant role in defeating definitions that had prevailed in earlier times, such as ones maintaining that art is representation, expression or significant form | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I really think the first rule of philosophical aesthetics is 'ignore Marcel Duchamp'. We wouldn't give up our idea of philosophy if someone managed to publish a long string of expletives in a philosophy journal. Would we?? |
20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: 'Aesthetic functionalism' maintains that something is an artwork if it is intended to provide the person who contemplates it for its own sake with an aesthetic experience of a significant magnitude on the basis of its aesthetic features. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [Beardsley is cited as having this view] For this you need to know what an aesthetic 'feature' is, and you'd have to indepdently recognise aesthetic experience. |
20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: One view explains music's expressiveness as 'associative'. Through being regularly associated with emotionally charged words or events, particular musical ideas become associated with emotions or moods. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is a more promising theory. I take the feeling in music to be parasitic on other feelings we have, and other triggers that evoke them. I'm particularly struck with story-telling (which Levinson and Robinson also like). |
20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'expression theory' holds that if music is sad that is because it expresses the composer's sadness, ...but composers take a long time composing sad works, and may even been gleeful at receiving payment for it. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Pretty conclusive. I see composing as like acting. Just as you can put on a happy or sad face, so a composer can discover music that feels sad or happy. Three movement sonatas don't fit expression at all. |
20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'institutional' theory says to be an artwork, an artwork must be appropriately placed within a web of practices, roles and frameworks that comprise an informally organised institution, the artworld. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites George Dickie] This theory seems to entirely developed to cope with the defiant gesture of Marcel Duchamp. Once I am an established artist, I have the authority to label anything I like as a work of art. Silly. |
20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Mendelssohn said that what music expresses is not too indefinite to put into words but, on the contrary, it is too definite. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Not sure whether that is true, but it is a lovely remark. It certainly challenges the naive philosophical view that words are the most precise mode of expression. |
20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The title as given by the artist is something we might need to know (Brueghel's 'Icarus', for example), ...and if a painting depicts one of two twins, it will be the artist's intention that settles which one it is. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Those two points strike me as conclusively in favour of the importance of an artist's perceived intentions. |
20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Learning that a work is a copy of an earlier work, or is done in the style of some other artist, is relevant to an evaluation of what its creator has achieved. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 3.6) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. We evaluate a forgery as an achievement, and the original plate of a great print as the focus of the achievement. We can assess the achievement of a poem in any printed copy. But what about perfect painting replicas? |
20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: 'Actual intentionalism' holds that work's meaning is what its author intended, ...while 'moderate actual intentionalism' allows that the author's intention determines the work's meaning only if that intention is carried through successfully. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Noel Carroll for the moderate version] D.H. Lawrence, probably with a dose of Freud, said 'trust the work, not the artist' (of Moby Dick, I think). The thought is that authors only half know intentions, and works reveal them. |
20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the 'hypothetical intentionalist', the work's meaning is determined by the intentions the audience is best justified in attributing to the author, whether or not these are the ones the author actually had. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 5.4) | |
A reaction: [Nehamas, Levinson and Jenefer Robinson are cited] This opens the door for psychiatric interpretations of 'Hamlet', and so on. The experts disagree over the nature of the audience needed to do the job. |
20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we could duplicate 'Mona Lisa', we're likely to be concerned to track the original and keep it separate from its clones, even if we judge that the clone isn't inferior to the original when the goal is art appreciation. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 4.3) | |
A reaction: But why? Is it just a sentimental attachment to what Leonardo worked on? Does the original manuscript of a work of literature have the same importance? We treasure such things, but not for aesthetic reasons. |
20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Some multiply instanced artworks, such as novel and poems, must have at least one instance. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is a comment on the idea that all artworks, even oil paintings and buildings are potentially multiply instanced (so the work is the type - Wollheim's view, not one of the tokens). |
20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'arousal' theory says music is sad because it moves the hearer to sadness, ...but this seems to get things back to front, because we normally think it is because the music is sad that it moves the listener to sadness. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The objection is right. If Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' always makes me feel sad (because it is so hopelessly optimistic), then that makes the music sad. Is the theory saying that there are no feelings in the music? |
22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: One case when the depiction of immorality becomes an artistic flaw …is when it is presented in brutal detail in a way that glorifies it. The celebration of evil corrodes the work's artistic value. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't allow for the case where the evil is celebrated in one part of a novel, yet the novel as a whole does not endorse the evil. The Marquis de Sade seems to have fully celebrated what we take to be evil. |
22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The positive moral stance of a story can be an artistic defect where it shapes the story in an inappropriate fashion. If it displays disproportionate moral outrage, …it reveals a lack of toleration, compassion, or insight into its subject-matter. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: There could be narrative irony in a story told by an angry and puritanical person, which continually condemns wickedness, with the reader expected to have a more tolerant attitude. Hard to think of any examples of this problem. |
22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: A work that looks for the audience's sympathetic approval and alienates them instead, because it's both morally repulsive and incoherent in what it requires them to suppose, isn't an artistic success. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: The implication seems to be that works are only successful if they achieve what the creator consciously intended. Lawrence said trust the novel, not the novelist. Milton's Satan is a famous example of heroism not intended by the author. |
22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Immorality in art is sometimes an artistic defect and sometimes not. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: Davies seems to avoid the 'immoralist' view, that immorality in a work of art can sometimes be a strength. A sharp distinction is needed, I think, between the morality of what is depicted, and the morality of the whole artwork. |