15 ideas
8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Perhaps it is impossible that an event should have had a causal history different from the one that it actually had. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.220) | |
A reaction: [He cites van Inwagen for this] The idea is analagous to baptismal accounts of reference. Individuate an event by its history. It might depend (as Davidson implies) on how you describe the event. |
8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
Full Idea: It has been argued that an event's time of occurrence is essential to it. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.221) | |
A reaction: [He cites Lawrence Lombard] This sound initially implausible, particularly if a rival event happened, say, .1 of a second later than the actual event. It might depend on one's view about determinism. Interesting. |
19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied by consciousness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195) | |
A reaction: This idea is very important in Leibniz, because non-conscious or barely conscious thoughts and perceptions explain a huge amount about behaviour, reality and morality. |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Everything takes place in souls as if there were no body, and everything takes place in bodies as if there were no souls. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
A reaction: I don't think I have ever encountered a modern thinker who accepts this view. Leibniz rejected Occasionalism, but his account depends entirely on the role of God, to set up the pre-established harmony. Why would God do that? |
19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Death, like generation, is only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195) | |
A reaction: Leibniz has a very unusual view of death, since neither minds nor their bodies can ever be wholly destroyed. Death is a kind of shrinking. I suspect that he was wrong about that. |
19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190) | |
A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422. |
19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert. |
8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
Full Idea: We must choose between subsumption and counterfactual analyses of causal statements. The former means that cause and effect have some properties that enables them to be subsumed under a conditional. The latter is just 'if no-c then no-e'. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.217) | |
A reaction: I have an immediate preference for the former account, which seems to potentially connect it with physics and features of the world which make one thing lead to another. The counterfactual account seems very thin, and is more like mere semantics. |
8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Although you cannot cause a fire by delaying something's burning, you can cause a fire by hastening something's burning. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.223) | |
A reaction: A very nice observation which brings out all sorts of problems about identifying causes. Bennett is criticising the counterfactual account. It is part of the problem of pre-emption, where causes are queueing up to produce a given effect. |
8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Theories of causation are split between event and fact/state of affairs theories. The first have the form 'the explosion caused the fire' (perfect nominals) and the second have the form 'the fire started because a bomb dropped' (sentential clauses). | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987]) | |
A reaction: Surely events must have priority? The form which uses facts is drifting off into explanation, and is much more likely to involve subjective human elements and interpretations. Events are closer to the physics, and the mechanics of what happens. |
8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
Full Idea: The refinement of a simple counterfactual analysis is to say that cause and effect depend on a series of events. This must be asserted because counterfactual conditionals are well known not to be transitive. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987]) | |
A reaction: This fills out the theory, but offers another target for critics. If the glue that binds the series is not in the counterfactuals, is it just in the mind of the speaker? How do you decide what's in the series? Cf. deciding offside in football (soccer!). |
8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Any counterfactual about a particular event implies or presupposes something about the event's essence. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.219) | |
A reaction: This is where the counterfactual theory suddenly becomes more interesting, instead of just being a rather bare account of the logical structure of causation. (Bennett offers some discussion of possible essential implications). |
19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The maxim that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, according to the laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.194) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's endorsement (uncredited) to Aquinas's First Way. It is hard to see how the laws of mechanics could have anything to say about the origin of movement. And doesn't the law say that the motions of God need a mover? |
19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof of God's existence, since it is manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause on which they all depend. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.192) | |
A reaction: Adjacent harmony seems self-explanatory, but remote harmony is interesting evidence for God. Hence modern quantum non-locality should make us all wonder whether there is a deeper explanation. |