Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Specimen inventorum' and 'Introspection'

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5 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory

5691	The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Some who reject the act-object conception of sensation favour an 'adverbial' account, where (instead of the act of 'seeing a red image') it is better to speak of 'being appeared to redly'.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.398)
	A reaction: The point is that you couldn't perceive without a colour (or travel without a speed), so the qualifying adverb is intrinsic to the process, not a separate object. The adverbial theory will imply a fairly minimal account of universals.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

19699	A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
	Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
	From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
	A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

12729	The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: That thing from whose state a reason for the changes is most readily provided is adjudged to be the cause. ...Causes are not derived from a real influence, but from the providing of a reason.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Specimen inventorum [1689], A6.4.1620), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
	A reaction: Leibniz is not denying that there are real influences. He seems to be offering the thesis which I am pursuing, that the need for explanation is the crucial factor in shaping the structure of our metaphysics.

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection

5687	For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395)
	A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them.

5688	Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396)
	A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible.