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22308
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Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Possibility always marks insufficient analysis: when analysis is completed, only the actual can be relevant, for the simple reason that there is only the actual, and that the mere possibility is nothing.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1913 [1913], VII.26), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Logic'
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A reaction:
Quine agreed with Russell on this. You won't get far in life if you deny possibilities. The answer is to recognise that the actual is dynamic, and not passive.
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2171
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The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
Homer left out another mental action lying between coming to a conclusion and acting on it; and he did well, since there is no such action, and the idea is the invention of bad philosophy.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.37
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A reaction:
This is a characteristically empiricist view, which is found in Hobbes. The 'will' seems to have a useful role in folk psychology. We can at least say that coming to a conclusion that I should act, and then actually acting, are not the same thing.
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21819
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Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
In Plato the order of generation is from the Good, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE], 509b) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
The doctrine of Plotinus merely echoes Plato, in that case, except that the One replaces the Form of the Good. Does this mean that what is first in Plotinus is less morally significant, and more concerned with reason and being?
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