Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Things and Their Parts' and 'Epistemic Norms'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
8820 Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Rather than truth being fundamental and rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach')
     A reaction: This nicely disturbs our complacency about such things. There is plenty of reasoning in Homer, but I bet there is no talk of 'truth'. Pontius Pilate seems to have been a pioneer (Idea 8821). Do the truth tables define or describe logical terms?
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
     Full Idea: It might be wondered why we even have a concept of truth. The answer is that this concept is required for defeasible reasoning.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach')
     A reaction: His point is that we must be able to think critically about our beliefs ('is p true?') if we are to have any knowledge at all. An excellent point. Give that man a teddy bear.
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
     A reaction: Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
     Full Idea: True statements about the necessary properties of things need not be necessarily true. The well-known example is that the number of planets (9) is necessarily an odd number. The necessity is de re, but not de dicto.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Nat.Internal')
     A reaction: This would be a matter of the scope (the placing of the brackets) of the 'necessarily' operator in a formula. The quick course in modal logic should eradicate errors of this kind in your budding philosopher.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
8818 Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach')
     A reaction: This is why I do not think animals 'know' anything, though they seem to have lots of true beliefs about their immediate situation.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
     Full Idea: When we ask whether a belief is justified, we want to know whether it is all right to believe it. The question we must ask is 'when is it permissible (epistemically) to believe P?'.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms')
     A reaction: Nice to see someone trying to get the question clear. The question clearly points to the fact that there must at least be some sort of social aspect to criteria of justification. I can't cheerfully follow my intuitions if everyone else laughs at them.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19699 A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
     Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
     From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
     A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Epistemologists have noted that logical entailments do not always constitute reasons. P may entail Q without the connection between P and Q being at all obvious.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern')
     A reaction: Graham Priest and others try to develop 'relevance logic' to deal with this. This would deny the peculiar classical claim that everything is entailed by a falsehood. A belief looks promising if it entails lots of truths about the world.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Epistemic norms are to be understood in terms of procedural knowledge involving internalized rules for reasoning.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?')
     A reaction: He offers analogies with bicycly riding, but the simple fact that something is internalized doesn't make it a norm. Some mention of truth is needed, equivalent to 'don't crash the bike'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
     Full Idea: When one makes a perceptual judgement on the basis of a perceptual state, I want to say that the perceptual state itself is one's reason. ..Reason are always reasons for beliefs, but the reasons themselves need not be beliefs.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Dir.Realism')
     A reaction: A crucial issue. I think I prefer the view of Davidson, in Ideas 8801 and 8804. Three options: a pure perception counts as a reason, or perceptions involve some conceptual content, or you only acquire a reason when a proposition is formulated.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
     Full Idea: If we had to make explicit appeal to epistemic norms for justification (the 'intellectualist model') we would find ourselves in an infinite regress. The norms, their existence and their application would themselves have to be justified.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?')
     A reaction: This is counter to the 'space of reasons' picture, where everything is rationally assessed. There are regresses for both reasons and for experiences, when they are offered as justifications.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Norm Externalism acknowledges that the content of our epistemic norms must be internalist, but employs external considerations in the selection of the norms themselves.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms')
     A reaction: It can't be right that you just set your own norms, so this must contain some truth. Equally, even the most hardened externalist can't deny that what goes on in the head of the person concerned must have some relevance.
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view in discussing epistemology.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern')
     A reaction: Pollock's point, quite reasonably, is that the first-person aspect must precede any objective assessment of whether someone knows. External facts, such as unpublicised information, can undermine high quality internal justification.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
     Full Idea: External considerations of reliability could not be internalized. Consequently, it is in principle impossible for us to actually employ externalist norms. I take this to be a conclusive refutation of belief externalism.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern')
     A reaction: Not so fast. He earlier rejected the 'intellectualist model' (Idea 8813), so he doesn't think norms have to be fully conscious and open to criticism. So they could be innate, or the result of indoctrination (sorry, teaching), or just forgotten.