Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Things and Their Parts' and 'A Powers Theory of Modality'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
12463 Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1)
     A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees.
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
     A reaction: Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
14375 If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: If a relation holds between two properties as a result of their intrinsic natures, then it appears the relation between the properties is not needed to do the structuring of reality; the properties themselves suffice to fix the structure.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.1)
     A reaction: [the first bit quotes Jubien 2007] He cites a group of scientific essentialists as spokesmen for this view. Sounds right to me. No on seems able to pin down what a relation is - which may be because there is no such entity.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
14378 Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Scientific practice seems aimed precisely at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.3)
     A reaction: Good. Friends of powers should look at this nice paper by Jacobs. There is a good degree of support for this view from pronouncements of modern scientists. If scientists don't support it, they should. Otherwise they are trapped in the superficial.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12467 Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: The source of powers is not the laws of nature; it is the powerful nature of the ordinary properties of concrete particulars.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2)
     A reaction: This pithily summarises my own view. People who think the powers of the world derive from the laws either have an implicit religious framework, or they are giving no thought at all to the ontological status of the laws.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
14377 Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: To be possible is just to be one of the many manifestations of some power, and to be impossible is to be a manifestation of no power.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2.1)
     A reaction: [This remark occurs in a discussion of theistic Aristotelianism] I like this. If we say that something is possible, the correct question is to ask what power could bring it about.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14376 States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2)
     A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14379 Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world).
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow?
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14372 Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3)
     A reaction: Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12466 All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4)
     A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
14371 We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1)
     A reaction: Wonderful. Just what the doctor ordered. The only caveat is that if we say that reality is built up from fundamental powers, then might those powers change their character without losing their identity (e.g. gravity getting weaker)?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12465 Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12464 If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3)
     A reaction: This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different.
12469 Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: If we want our semantics for modality to give us insight into the truthmakers for modality, then possible worlds semantics is inadequate.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4)
     A reaction: [See the other ideas of Jacobs (and Jubien) for this] It is an interesting question whether a semantics for a logic is meant to give us insight into how things really are, or whether it just builds nice models. Satisfaction, or truth?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19699 A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
     Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
     From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
     A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.