10 ideas
| 6558 | A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds [Emerson] |
| Full Idea: A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. | |
| From: Ralph Waldo Emerson (Self-Reliance [1841], p.37) | |
| A reaction: A remark to warm the hearts of pragmatists, Wittgensteinians, Nietzscheans and the post-modern mob. But pay careful attention to the word "foolish". Robert Fogelin gives a very balanced view of the matter (e.g. Idea 6557). |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
| From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
| A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3) |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship). |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro) |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5) |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6) |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |