5 ideas
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be in me of which I am entirely unaware. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4 | |
A reaction: This I take to be a place where Descartes is utterly and catastrophically wrong. Until you grasp the utter falseness of this thought, the possibility of you (dear reader) understanding human beings is zero. Here 'I' obviously means his mind. |
20057 | Philosophy of action studies the roles of psychological states in causing behaviour [Mele] |
Full Idea: The central task of the philosophy of action is the exploration of the roles played by a collection of psychological states in the etiology of intentional behaviour. | |
From: Alfred R. Mele (Springs of Action [1992], p.3), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 5 'Psychological' | |
A reaction: Stout glosses this as a rather distinctive view, which endorses the causal theory of action (as opposed to citing reasons and justifications for actions). A key debate is whether the psychological inputs really do cause the outputs. |
3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
Full Idea: According to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 108) |
3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
Full Idea: My inability to grasp an infinite chain of successive causes without a first cause does not entail that there must be a first cause, just as my inability to grasp infinite divisibility of finite things does not make that impossible. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 106) |