Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Brandom on Social Practices and Representations' and 'The Individual, the State, and the Common Good'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy

19090	If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
	Full Idea: If we cannot check our language against non-linguistic awareness, then philosophy can never be more than a discussion of the utility and compatibility of beliefs - and, more particularly, of the various vocabularies in which those beliefs are formulated.
	From: Richard Rorty (Brandom on Social Practices and Representations [1998], iii.127), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.178
	A reaction: I'm amazed at how many people I encounter in philosophy circles (compared with none at all outside those circles) who seem to think that we cannot check our language against our non-linguistic awareness. Rorty is their guru. Weird.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

19699	A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
	Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
	From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
	A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique

22251	Liberalism may fail because it neglects the shared nature of what we pursue and protect [Haldane]
	Full Idea: I am interested in the claim that liberalism fails inasmuch as it neglects, and cannot accommodate, the fact that some or all of the goods we pursue, and which a system of rights is concerned to protect, are goods possessed in common.
	From: John Haldane (The Individual, the State, and the Common Good [1996], III)
	A reaction: It depends how individualistic we take liberalism to be. Extreme individualism (Nozick) strikes me as crazy. If 'we' erect a statue to some dubious politicians, it might be presented as a common good, but actually be despised by many.