Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'The Evolution of Co-Operation' and 'works'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (works [1920], 5.3)
     A reaction: Kit Fine refers somewhere to 'unrepentent Skolemites' who still hold this view.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
     Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
     From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
     A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod]
     Full Idea: When players will never meet again, the strategy of defection is the only stable strategy.
     From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 5)
     A reaction: This gives good grounds for any community's mistrust of transient strangers, such as tourists. And yet any sensible tourist will want communities to trust tourists, and will therefore behave in a reliable way.
Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod]
     Full Idea: Successful game strategies avoid unnecessary conflict, are provoked by an uncalled for defection, forgive after a provocation, and behave clearly so the other player can adapt.
     From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] Exactly what you would expect from a nice but successful school teacher. The strategies for success in these games is the same as the rules for educating a person into cooperative behaviour. TIT FOR TAT does all these.