4 ideas
| 7081 | Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath] |
| Full Idea: There is no such thing as philosophy as a basic or universal science alongside or above the various fields of the one empirical science. | |
| From: Otto Neurath (works [1930]), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This is what you get for becoming an empiricist. If philosophy is the quest for human wisdom, it seems to me highly unlikely that physical sciences will provide it. Human interests and values and understanding play absolutely no role in physics. |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
| From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
| A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| Full Idea: T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism. | |
| From: report of T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1 | |
| A reaction: This is, of course, impossible, because there can't be a clear statement of epiphenomenalism. |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| Full Idea: All states of consciousness are caused by molecular changes of brain substance. It seems to me there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism. | |
| From: T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893], p.244), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1 | |
| A reaction: This sounds odd. Most people would say there is nothing more obvious than mental events causing actions. It certainly seems undeniable that actions are cause by the contents of thoughts, so a molecular account of intentional states is needed. |