Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?' and 'III.10 On Restraining your Will'

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8 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
     Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
     From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
     A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
     Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
     A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical!
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
     Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
     A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
     Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120)
     A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153)
     A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142)
     A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153)
     A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139)
     A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat.