24 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' can be taken as true without have any truthmaker. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: There might be an equivocation over 'true' here. 'What, really really true that he IS a fictional mouse?' |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice. |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: My take on truth is a fairly deflationary one: The role of the truth predicate is to enable us to assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro) | |
A reaction: Clearly this is a role for truth, as in 'I forget what he said, but I know it was true', but it isn't remotely what most people understand by true. We use 'true' about totally explicit sentences all the time. |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: Names function the same way (semantically and grammatically) regardless of whether or not there's an object that they refer to. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3 n55) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a fairly clear rebuttal of the 'Fido'-Fido view of names (that the meaning of the name IS the dog), which never seems to quite go away. A name is a peg on which description may be hung, seems a good slogan to me. |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: If the argument isn't that, metaphysically speaking, anything that exists must have causal powers - how on earth would we show that? - rather, the claim is an epistemic one. Any thing we're in a position to know about we must causally interact with. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: A very good point. I am attracted to causal power as a criterion for existence, but Azzouni's distinction is vital. Maybe there is just no point in even talking about things which exist but have no causal powers. |
5953 | For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really. |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: It's robustly part of common sense that fictional objects don't exist in any sense at all, and this means they aren't abstracta either. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Nice. It is so easy to have some philosopher dilute and equivocate over the word 'object' until you find yourself committed to all sorts of daft things as somehow having objectual existence. We can discuss things which don't exist in any way at all. |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: It is widespread in contemporary metaphysics to extract commitments to various types of object on the basis of the logical form of certain sentences. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I'm with Azzouni in thinking that this procedure is a very bad idea. I'm increasingly inclined towards the wild view that people are only ontologically committed to things if they explicitly say that they are so committed. |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: The argument that objectual quantifiers are ontologically committing has the crucial and unnoticed presupposition that the language in which the semantics for the objectual quantifiers is couched (the 'metalanguage') also has quantifiers with commitment. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, presumably we find ourselves ontologically committed to the existence of quantifiers, and are also looking at an infinite regress. See Idea 12439. |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: There are no linguistic devices, no idioms (not 'there is', not 'exists') that unequivocally indicate ontological commitment in the vernacular. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems right, since people talk in such ways about soap opera, while understanding the ontological situation perfectly well. Presumably Quine is seeking higher standards than the vernacular, if we are doing science. |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: A slogan: One can't read ontological commitments from semantic conditions unless one has already smuggled into those semantic conditions the ontology one would like to read off. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The arguments supporting this are subtle, but it's good enough for me, as I never thought anyone was ontologically committed just because they used the vagueries of language to try to say what's going on around here. |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: Things that don't exist don't have any properties. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Sounds reasonable! I totally agree, but that is because my notion of properties is sparse and naturalistic. If you identify properties with predicates (which some weird people seem to), then non-existents can have properties like 'absence' or 'nullity'. |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
3023 | Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3026 | Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 | |
A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'. |
3024 | Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 | |
A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'. |
3025 | For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 |
3019 | No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3021 | The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3027 | Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13 |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: The periodic table not only governs what elements there can be, with their properties, but also explicitly excludes others sorts of elements, because the elements are individuated by the number of discrete protons in their nuclei. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It has to be central to the thesis of scientific essentialism that the possibilities in nature are far more restricted than is normally thought, and this observation illustrates the view nicely. He makes a similar point about subatomic particles. |