Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy' and 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought

23392	The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
	Full Idea: The 'Dao' (tr 'Way) has five meanings: 1) path or road, 2) mode of doing something, 3) account of how to do something, 4) the right way to live, and 5) the ultimate metaphysical entity responsible for nature, and how it should be.
	From: Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], 1.III)
	A reaction: [compressed] So it is essentially metaphorical, just like the English 'way to do a thing'. Number 5 seems a rather large leap from the others, and most discussion seems to centre on number 4. The Chinese hoped for consensus on the Dao.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics

23408	The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
	Full Idea: The first type of hermeneutic circle operates inside the text, studying relationships between sentences. …The second type is between the text and the reader, …who brings assumptions about what it means.
	From: Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], App A.I)
	A reaction: The first kind is an essential aspect of reading well. Readers are biased, but I get very tired of those who do nothing but search for bias, and ignore the truth a text has to offer. If everything is bias, intellectual life is dead.

23407	Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
	Full Idea: A 'hermeneutics of faith' treat a text as a candidate for truth. ….A 'hermeneutics of suspicion' looks not for truth but for explanations of why someone makes certain claims, …particularly to serve their ulterior interests.
	From: Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], App I.1)
	A reaction: As far as I can see, the suspicious approach was a legitimate development in sociology, which studies the sources of ideas, but is absurdly offered by some philosophers as a total replacement of the faith approach.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

5831	The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

5829	We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.

5830	The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind

20363	Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences [Nietzsche]
	Full Idea: Every concept arises through the setting equal of the unequal. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never wholly equal to another, so it is certain that the concept leaf is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences.
	From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense [1872]), quoted by John Richardson - Nietzsche's System 2.1.1 n28
	A reaction: Nietzsche adds an interesting aspect to psychological abstraction, of abstracting away the differences between things, which we might label as the (further) capacity for Equalisation. If two cars differ only in a blemish, we abstract away the blemish.

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

5826	The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
	A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.