27 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, as not primarily a quest for definitions, but as a quest for truth-makers. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand') | |
A reaction: This is not a dichotomy, I think, but a shift of emphasis. A definition will probably refer to truthmakers; a decent account of truthmakers would approximate a definition. |
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Predications seem, for the most part, to be true not because of whether things are, but because of how things are. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand') | |
A reaction: This simple point shows that you get into a tangle if you insist that truthmakers just consist of what exists. Lewis says Armstrong offers states of affairs as truthmakers for predications. |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth') | |
A reaction: [His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case. |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Presentism says that although there is nothing outside the present, yet there are past-tensed and future-tensed truths that do not supervene on the present, and hence do not supervene on being. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], p.207) | |
A reaction: Since I rather like both presentism and truth supervening on being, this observation comes as rather a devastating blow. I thought philosophy would be quite easy, but it's turning out to be rather tricky. Could tensed truths supervene on the present? |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To me it is mysterious how a state of affairs is made out of its particular and universal constituents. Different states of affairs may have the very same constituents, and the existence of constituents by no means entails the existence of the states. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'What is there') | |
A reaction: He is rejecting the structure of states of affairs as wholes made of parts. But then mereology was never going to explain the structure of the world. |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
23928 | Good art produces exaltation and detachment [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: The contemplation of pure form leads to a state of extraordinary exaltation and complete detachment from the concerns of life. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.III) | |
A reaction: The last part is what gets the arts a bad name with the people who do deal with the concerns of life (which won't go away, even for an artist!). However, being totally trapped in the concerns of life is probably a recipe for misery. |
23922 | The word 'beauty' leads to confusion, because it denotes distinct emotions [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: The word 'beauty' connotes objects of quite distinguishable emotions, and the term would land me in confusions and misunderstandings. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.I) | |
A reaction: His main example is a comparison of beautiful women with beautiful art. Personally I don't think the word aspires to be precise, so there is no problem. Maths has beautiful solutions, golf has beautiful shots, cooking has beautiful results. Wow! |
23921 | Our feeling for natural beauty is different from the aesthetic emotion of art [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: It is not what I call an aesthetic emotion that most of us feel, generally, for natural beauty. …Most people feel a very different kind of emotion for birds, flowers and butterfly wings from that we feel for pictures, pots, temples and statues. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.I) | |
A reaction: Not convinced. I think the main difference is our awareness that art is a human production, the result of choice, whereas nature is a given. Beethoven 9 and a good sunset don't seem to me far apart in our responses. |
23929 | We only see landscapes as artistic if we ignore their instrumental value [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: It is only when we cease to regard the objects in a landscape as means to anything that we can feel the landscape artistically. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], II.I) | |
A reaction: This sounds as if only the exploitative attitude blocks the artistic view, but I would expect the scientific view (of an ecologist, for example) to do the same. |
23923 | Visual form can create a sublime mental state [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: Pure visual form transports me to an infinitely sublime state of mind. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.I) | |
A reaction: Unusual for anyone to use to term 'sublime' for works of art, and I suspect that Bell was the last to do so. Bell offers a quasi-religious role for art. I accept that being struck by something exceptionally good in art is a very distinctive experience. |
23932 | Art is the expression of an emotion for ultimate reality [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: My hypothesis is that art is the expression of an emotion for ultimate reality. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], II.II) | |
A reaction: So later in his discussion the word 'ultimate' has crept in, after a chapter about the close relation between religious and artistic attitudes. He also sees good art as deeply 'spiritual'. It seems that religious belief is essential to his theory of art. |
23927 | Aestheticism invites artist to create beauty, but with no indication of how to do it [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: The danger of aestheticism is that the artist who has got nothing to do but make something beautiful hardly knows where to begin or where to end | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.III) | |
A reaction: Aestheticism strikes me as the main motivation for art nouveau artifacts, which I love. You start with beautiful lines, and then find ways to implement them. Bell has a point, though! |
8115 | Only artists can discern significant form; other people must look to art to find it [Bell,C, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: Bell thinks that only artists can discern significant form directly in the natural world, and that all others must look to art for significant form. | |
From: report of Clive Bell (Art [1913]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.3 | |
A reaction: I have a horrible feeling that 'significant' form will turn out to be the sort of form that artists can see. Presumably the form spotted by geologists won't be quite so 'significant'. Not a promising theory. |
23924 | Maybe significant form gives us a feeling for ultimate reality [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: When we strip things of all associations and significance, what is left is 'the thing in itself', or 'ultimate reality'. …Artists can express an emotion felt for reality through line and colour. …So through 'significant form' we sense ultimate reality. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.III) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The thing in itself is a Kantian idea. He offers this as a speculation, rather than a fact. Maybe quantum physics gets us closer to the thing in itself? Bell knows that his faith in significant form needs more justification than an emotion. |
23931 | Significant form is the essence of art, which I believe expresses an emotion about reality [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: My view that the essential quality in work of art is significant form was based on experience I am sure about. Of my view that significant form is the expression of a peculiar emotion felt for reality I am far from confident. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], II.II) | |
A reaction: It is hard to understand the idea of 'significant' form without a clear proposal for the nature of the significance. A detective doesn't stop at the point where evidence is seen as significant. Why should a 'peculiar' emotion matter? |
20434 | 'Form' is visual relations, and it is 'significant' if it moves us aesthetically; art needs both [Bell,C, by Feagin] |
Full Idea: By 'form' Bell means the relations of lines, colours and shapes. Forms are 'significant' when the relationships of lines and so on move us aesthetically. If something is art it must have, to at least a minimum extent, significant form. | |
From: report of Clive Bell (Art [1913], p.17) by Susan Feagin - Roger Fry and Clive Bell 3 | |
A reaction: So art has two necessary conditions - that it move us aesthetically, and that it does so by means of its form. The obvious problem is to explain which forms are 'significant' without mentioning the aesthetic feeling they have to invoke. |
23934 | The only expression art could have is the emotion resulting from pure form [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: If art expresses anything, it expresses an emotion felt for pure form and that which gives pure form its extraordinary significance. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], III.I) | |
A reaction: I don't think 'expresses' is the right word here. Artists express, but works just transmit. I personally doubt whether anything can have 'extraordinary significance' simply because it expresses one particular emotion. Why art, but not geometry? |
23925 | Mere copies of pictures are not significant - unless the copies are very exact [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: A literal copy is seldom reckoned even by its owner a work of art. Its forms are not significant. Yet if it were an absolutely exact copy, clearly it would be as moving as the original, and a photographic reproduction of a drawing often is. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.III) | |
A reaction: What if the original artist made the copy? In 1913, Bell begins to spot this modern problem. He undermines his own theory of significant form here, if the form only becomes significant once we have checked it is an original. |
23926 | Art is distinguished by its aesthetic emotion, which produces appropriate form [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: The characteristic of a work of art is its power of provoking aesthetic emotion; the expression of emotion is what gives it its power. ...Rightness of form is invariably a consequence of rightness of emotion. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], I.III) | |
A reaction: Bell doesn't dig very deep, because the obvious next question, not really addressed, is what makes the emotion 'right'. He suggests that significant form reveals reality, but why would an emotion do that? Does each work have a distinct emotion? |
23933 | Aesthetic contemplation is the best and most intense mental state [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: Art is not only a means to good states of mind, but, perhaps, the best and most potent that we possess; …there is no state of mind more excellent or more intense than the state of aesthetic contemplation. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], II.III) | |
A reaction: Why does intensity make it good? It is pretty intense being involved in a road accident, but that doesn't make it good. There are many states of mind we enjoy or value highly, but we need more than that to prove them objectively 'excellent'. |
23935 | Aesthetic experience is an exaltation which increases the possibilities of life [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: Those who have been thrilled by the pure aesthetic significance of a work of art …carry a state of excitement and exaltation making them more sensitive to all that is going forward about them. Thus they realise …the significance and possibility of life. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], IV.III) | |
A reaction: This seems like a bit of an afterthought, because he struggles to explain why his 'significant form' is so important. He shifts between it being an end - an intrinsic value - or a moral state, or now an increaser of life potential. |
22691 | Only artistic qualities matter in art, because they also have the highest moral value [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: The only relevant qualities in art are artistic qualities: judged as a means to good, no other qualities are worth considering; for there are no qualities of greater moral value than artistic qualities, since there is no greater means to good than art. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], II.III) | |
A reaction: Wishful thinking, I suspect. I can't see anyone acquiring a moral education just by looking a Cezannes. This seems to be a late manifesto for the aesthetic movement. |
23930 | Religion sees infinite value in some things, and irrelevance in the rest [Bell,C] |
Full Idea: The essence of religion is a conviction that because some things are of infinite value most are profoundly unimportant. | |
From: Clive Bell (Art [1913], II.I) | |
A reaction: The aspect of religion which most worries atheists like Nietzsche. You can end up with a rather cool and detached view of genocide, if you really believe that worldly matters are unimportant. Do souls in heaven worry about the next life after that? |