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All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts' and 'Ethical Studies'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

5831	The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

5829	We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.

5830	The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files

16369	There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
	Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file.
	From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2
	A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point.

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

5826	The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
	A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness

5655	Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
	Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
	A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).