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5831
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The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
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Full Idea:
Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
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From:
Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
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A reaction:
This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.
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16736
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Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
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Full Idea:
Generally speaking, to render a reason of an effect or phenomenon is to deduce it from something else in nature more known than itself, and consequently there may be diverse kinds of degrees of explication of the same thing.
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From:
Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
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A reaction:
There is a picture of a real explanatory structure to nature, from which we pick bits that interest us for entirely pragmatic reasons. Boyle and I are as one on this matter.
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16737
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The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
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Full Idea:
Explications be most satisfactory that show how the effect is produced by the more primitive affects of matter (bulk, shape and motion) but are not to be despised that deduce them from more familiar qualities such as heat, weight, fluidity, fermentation.
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From:
Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:22), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
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A reaction:
[Compressed, and continued from Idea 16736] So there is a causal structure, and the best explanations go to the bottom of it, but lesser explanations only go half way down. So a very skimpy explanation ('dormative power') is still an explanation.
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12719
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Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
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A reaction:
For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.
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