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All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Probability and Logic of Rational Belief' and 'The Conquest of Happiness'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says you should rationally conclude that your ticket will not win the lottery, and then apply the same reasoning to all the other tickets, and conclude that no ticket will win the lottery.
     From: report of Henry E. Kyburg Jr (Probability and Logic of Rational Belief [1961]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §7.2.8
     A reaction: (Very compressed by me). I doubt whether this is a very deep paradox; the conclusion that I will not win is a rational assessment of likelihood, but it is not the result of strict logic.
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
     A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell]
     Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note).
Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell]
     Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now.
Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell]
     Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates.
Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell]
     Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work.