Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour

6848	Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Humour, for me, is practically enacted philosophy.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: This may be overstating it, as the funniest jokes may be the least philosophical, and remarks may be faintly amusing but very profound. Lear and his Fool make up a single worldview together.

6847	Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Humour provides an oblique phenomenology of ordinary life; it is a way of describing the situation of our existence, and, at its best, it indicates how we might change that situation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: The trouble is that this leads us to relentlessly political standup comedians who aren't very funny. Critichley may have a problem with remarks which are very funny precisely because they are so politically incorrect. I sympathise, though.

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

6844	Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
	A reaction: He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy

6835	German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
	A reaction: He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.

6836	Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
	Full Idea: If reason must criticise itself (in Kant) how does one avoid total scepticism? In my view, the problem that has animated the continental tradition since Jacobi (early 19th cent) is the threat of nihilism.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
	A reaction: As an outsider to 'continental' philosophy, this is the most illuminating remark I have read about it. It is not only a plausible account of the movement, but also a very worth aim, which should be taken seriously by analytical philosophers.

6837	Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
	A reaction: I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.

6838	Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
	Full Idea: The basic map of the continental tradition can be summarised in three terms: critique, praxis and emancipation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.189)
	A reaction: I wince at 'emancipation', which seems to take freedom as of unquestionably high value, instead of being one of the principles up for question in social philosophy. There are more presuppositions in Marxist than in analytical philosophy.

6845	Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
	A reaction: From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology

6846	Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Phenomenology (as in the later Husserl) is for me a way of assembling reminders which clarify the social world in which we exist; it is a technique of redescription.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: I'm not sure if I can identify with this as a target for philosophy, but it is interesting and sound worthy of effort. Critchley offers this as the best strand in 'continental' philosophy, rather than the big explanatory ideas.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

5831	The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

5829	We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.

5830	The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding

19261	Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: What is distinctive about understanding (after truth is satisfied) is the internal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-inducing relationships in a body of information that is crucial for understanding.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding [2003], 198), quoted by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Distinction'
	A reaction: For me this ticks exactly the right boxes. Coherent explanations are what we want. The hardest part is the ensure their truth. Kvanvig claims this is internal, so we can understand even if, Gettier-style, our external connections are lucky.

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

5826	The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
	A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism

6843	Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
	Full Idea: If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
	A reaction: This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.