26 ideas
| 2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32) |
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
| 2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147) |
| 2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"? | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95) |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
| 23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The Humean view says properties are 'quiddities', which individuates properties by nothing more than their distinctness from one another, so that dispositions are not essential to them, and there is no limit to possible property recombination. | |
| From: report of Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.3.1) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [my summary] All of this is implied by Hume, rather than stated. David Lewis supports this view. The theory of basic powers is the view's main opponent. This quidditist view is not found in physics, where a property's modal profile matters. |
| 23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: Dispositions constitute the essences of properties, and hence the identity of a property is not primitive ('quidditism'), but is given in terms of its dispositional relations to other properties. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.3.1) | |
| A reaction: I like the picture that powers are basic, giving rise to dispositions, which combine to produce qualitative and active properties. Powers are precise and relatively few, and properties are ill-defined and very numerous. Being 'influential', for example. |
| 23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: In broad terms: powers are properties that necessitate dispositions. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: If powers are properties then they must be properties 'of' something, which then seems to be more fundamental than the powers. Maybe our concept of an electron helps, which seems to be a bundle of a few properties, but no one even asks 'of' what. |
| 23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: Dispositional essentialism yields the view that just fundamental properties and some evolved macro properties are powers. The grounding view, by contrast, seems to yield the result that all properties are powers. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.7) | |
| A reaction: For the second view, Mumford (for example) claims that the sphericity of a ball is a power, but that seems to miss the whole motivation for the powers ontology, which offers a fairly fundamental explanation of laws and modality. |
| 23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: In the 'dispositional essentialist' account (the main view) …what it is to be a power is to be a property whose essence is exhaustively constituted by dispositions. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Sounds wrong to me. A very complex property (such as 'stormy' weather) could be nothing more than a large bundle of dispositions, but that wouldn't make it a 'power', which has to be simpler and more basic. |
| 23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: In the 'grounding' view of powers …powers are qualitative, because their essence can be specified independently of any dispositions or relations, but they fully ground dispositions. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] They give this as the rival view to dispositional essentialism. It may be a mistake to call a power a property (which needs to be 'of' something). Not sure how powers can be both fundamental and qualitative. Don't they also ground qualities? |
| 23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: The three platitudes about dispositions are that 1) they are directed towards some specific behaviour, 2) they can be triggered under specific conditions, and 3) their directedness is modal, meaning not 'when it is triggered' but 'it it were triggered'. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.1.1) | |
| A reaction: [PG summary] This is the preliminary to an attempt at a precise formal analysis, covering a number of hypothetical problem cases. 3) is the counterfactual rather than material conditional. Seems accurate. |
| 23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: A disposition is 'masked' when it fails to manifest due to interference, such as a fragile vase packed in bubble wrap, or an antidote taken after some poison. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The easiest account of these would be to say that the stimulus or trigger of the disposition never completely occurs. Poisons are only disposed to kill when they are fully ingested. Bubble wrapped vases can't be properly struck. |
| 23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: A disposition is subject to 'altering' when the stimulus of the disposition influences whether (and to what degree) an object has that disposition. Either a live wire goes dead when it is touched, or a dead wire has a sensor making it live when touched. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.2) | |
| A reaction: The word 'fink' is used of such interference. Not much of a problem, I would say, because at the moment when the stimulus comes to do its job, there is no longer a disposition for it to trigger. No different from switching off a light. |
| 23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: A disposition is 'mimicked' by objects without that disposition which behave as though they do have it. Styrofoam plates are not fragile, but make a horrible sound when stressed, causing some annoyed person to break them. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.3) | |
| A reaction: A rather strained example! It shouldn't be a problem if the same cause (stress) leads to the same effect (breaking), but by a different path which is not the same as fragility. A formal analysis must obviously cover this case. |
| 23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: A 'trick' can behave like a disposition, as when someone says 'abracadabra' over a hot cup of coffee, stimulating it (?) to gradually cool down. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.4) | |
| A reaction: This is like Humean constant conjunction which is obviously not a cause, such as night following day. Only a problem is this cup of coffee is seen in isolation from all other cups of coffee. Post hoc propter hoc does not apply to all stimuli! |
| 23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: Some dispositions, such as loquaciousness or irascibility, are disposed to manifest whether they are provoked to do so. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.3.3) | |
| A reaction: We might surmise that such people have internal triggers that get them going, rather than overt ones. The Sun has a disposition to shine, without an external stimulus. The theory of powers says nature is active, rather than being disposed to activity. |
| 23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: We might abandon the relational analysis of dispositions (as stimulus-effect), and just say a disposition is a 'possibility', which simply can manifest, however that manifestation comes about. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.3.5) | |
| A reaction: [Compressed. He particularly cites Barbara Vetter] A mere 'possibility' seems to cover passive states as well as potentially active ones. A cushion can be dented, but I wouldn't say it was 'disposed' to dent. Radioactive decay is a disposition, though. |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: Dispositionalism does not 'outsource' modality to other possible worlds, it roots modality in the powers of concrete individuals in this world. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.3.3) | |
| A reaction: Possible worlds are to abolish modality, by treating it as the non-modal facts of different worlds. I see the dispositional view as vastly superior, because the world is awash with vivid and undeniable potentialities, and one world is better ontology. |
| 2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19) |
| 2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false? | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22) |
| 20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40) | |
| A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing. |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
| A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
| 2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140) |
| 23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: Hume's Dictum says there are no necessary connections between existences, …and also between the distinct properties that individuals instantiate. …It follows that an object's property of mass and its disposition to warp space-time could come apart. | |
| From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This nicely pinpoints the heart of the Humean view, to which scientific essentialists and fans of powers in nature object. The objectors include me. |