9 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Under strong Kleene tables, a disjunction will be true if one of the disjuncts is true, regardless of whether or not the other disjunct has a truth-value; under the weak table it is required that the other disjunct also have a value. So for other cases. | |
From: Kit Fine (Some Puzzles of Ground [2010], n7) | |
A reaction: [see also p.111 of Fine's article] The Kleene tables seem to be the established form of modern three-valued logic, with the third value being indeterminate. |
21677 | How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38) | |
A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'. |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The general formal principles of grounding are Transitivity (A«B, B«C/A«C: if A helps ground B and B helps C, then A helps C), Irreflexivity (A«A/absurd: A can't ground itself) and Factivity (A«B/A; A«/B: for grounding both A and B must be the case). | |
From: Kit Fine (Some Puzzles of Ground [2010], 4) |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
21667 | Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03) | |
A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful. |
21678 | If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40) | |
A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires. |