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All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Bayesianism' and 'Syntagma'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

5831	The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

5829	We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.

5830	The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes

16730	If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

2798	Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
	Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
	From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)

2799	Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
	Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation.
	From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

16619	We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

5826	The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
	A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism

16593	Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
	A reaction: If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.

16729	How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.