12 ideas
| 20923 | We take part in objective truth, rather than observe it from a distance [Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Hermeneutic thinkers insist that we need to redefine objective truth as something we take part in rather than something we merely observe from a distance. | |
| From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 1 'Truth') | |
| A reaction: Don't get it. If I objectively judge that there are some cows in a field, I judge that they will probably still be there if I turn away and forget them, so any passionate involvement I have with cows is irrelevant to the objective facts. Am I wrong? |
| 20926 | Hermeneutic knowledge is not objective, but embraces interpretations [Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: In the hermeneutic ideal of knowledge, not distance but involvement, not impersonal observation but personal interaction, not thinking against prejudice or tradition but accessing knowledge through them, characterizes our perception of the world. | |
| From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 3 'Beyond') | |
| A reaction: To make this stick it will have to challenge scientific knowledge which results from mathematical summaries of measurements done by instruments. Is a stop watch an interpretation? |
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
| 20924 | In phenomenology, all perception is 'seeing as' [Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: That human perception is always a 'seeing as' was the cardinal insight of what Husserl called 'phenomenology'. | |
| From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 2 'Husserl's') | |
| A reaction: I presume that 'cardinal insight' means there is no possibility of Husserl being wrong about this. What's happening before you figure out what it is you are looking at? |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
| A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
| 13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
| Full Idea: There are two senses of 'semantic' - as theory of meaning or as truth-based theory of logical consequence, and they are very different. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.78) | |
| A reaction: This subtle point is significant in considering the role of logic in philosophy. The logicians' semantics (based on logical consequence) is in danger of ousting the broader and more elusive notion of meaning in natural language. |
| 13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones. |
| 20927 | The hermeneutic circle is between the reader's self-understanding, and the world of the text [Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: The 'hermeneutic circle' of understanding is not between the author and the reader, but between my understanding myself in my own world, and the world projected by the text, with its possibilities for life. | |
| From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 4 'How texts') | |
| A reaction: I'm not much of a fan of hermeneutics, but this idea seems quite important. Readings of Dickens in1860, 1930 and 2020 are very different events. For example, which parts catch the reader's interest, or jar with their sensibilities? |
| 20933 | Natural law theorists fear that without morality, law could be based on efficiency [Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Natural law theorists fear that by denying the intrinsic connection between law and morality, positivists could encourage the validation of law based on efficiency alone. | |
| From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 6 'Natural') | |
| A reaction: The law's the law. The issue can only be whether one can ever be justified in breaking a law, and that isn't a legal question. I am sympathetic to the positiviists. |
| 20929 | Traditionally, God dictated the Torah to Moses, unlike the later biblical writings [Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Jewish traditionalists hold that the first five books of the Hebrew Bible (the 'Torah') were dictated word for word by God to Moses, while the remaining sacred writings were more generally inspired. | |
| From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 5 'Inspiration') | |
| A reaction: This gives the Torah a similar status to the Quran, and presumably also to the actual words which are ascribed to Jesus in the four gospels. |