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23766
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Don't be tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine, by cunning deceptive men [Paul]
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Full Idea:
Henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.
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From:
St Paul (10: Ephesians [c.55], 4:14)
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A reaction:
One quoted to me by a learned religious friend, in response to Idea 23767. I sympathise. I find it extraordinary the nonsense that students of philosophy can be led into, when they swallow some specious argument.
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5831
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The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
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Full Idea:
Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
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From:
Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
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A reaction:
This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.
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19463
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Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this?
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19459
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To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
To say 'I am not thinking' is self-stultifying since if it is said intelligently it must be false: but it is not self-contradictory. The proof that it is not self-contradictory is that it might have been false.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
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A reaction:
If it doesn't imply a contradiction, then it is not a necessary truth, which is what it is normally taken to be. Is 'This is a sentence' necessarily true? It might not have been one, if the rules of English syntax changed recently.
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19460
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'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
If there is no experience at all of finding out that one is not conscious, or that one does not exist, ..it is tempting to say that sentences like 'I exist', 'I am conscious', 'I know that I exist' do not express genuine propositions.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
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A reaction:
This is, of course, an application of the somewhat discredited verification principle, but the fact that strictly speaking the principle has been sort of refuted does not mean that we should not take it seriously, and be influenced by it.
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19462
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Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
Inductive reasoning covers all cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact, or set of them, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. The inference may be to a general law, or by analogy to another particular instance.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
My preferred definition is 'learning from experience' - which I take to be the most rational behaviour you could possibly imagine. I don't think a definition should be couched in terms of 'objects' or 'particulars'.
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