6 ideas
19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe in accordance with its own viewpoint or relationship to the rest, so that all are in perfect correspondence with one another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Identity in Substances and True Propositions [1686], p.98) | |
A reaction: Thus 'expression' (something like mapping what is exterior) is the mechanism through which God achieves harmony in the universe. Instants of time are said to be successive moments of perfect harmony. |
19508 | Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions. | |
From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5 | |
A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge. |
19509 | The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S] |
Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'. | |
From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5 | |
A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me. |
8070 | It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: It would be a great improvement if, instead of 'morally wrong', one always named a genus such as 'untruthful', 'unchaste', or 'unjust'. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.183) | |
A reaction: People are indeed much more struck by the suggestion that they have a weakness of character, rather than that they have just done something wrong. This is Anscombe's first great appeal for a return to virtue as the basis of ethics. |
8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: The moral sense of 'ought' and of what is right should be jettisoned, if possible, because they are survivals from an earlier conception of ethics, and are only harmful without it. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.175) | |
A reaction: This is part of a revolutionary proposal to return to virtue theory, and has had a great influence (e.g. on me). Richard Taylor gives a good account of how duty lost its social and religious underpinnings. Our duties now seem to be purely contractual. |
8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: Between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics, and Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.179) | |
A reaction: While I am a fan of the primacy of the virtues in ethical thinking, I am doubtful about the complete elimination of laws (e.g. by Particularists). The law teaches us the virtues, and reminds us of them (like speed-limit signs). |