Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism', 'Letter Seven' and 'Causes and Events: Mackie on causation'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
4779 For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: A dominant view, attributed mainly to Kim, is that events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Events: Mackie on causation [1971]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
     A reaction: The obvious thought is that we might not describe something as an 'event' just because a property was exemplified (seeing red?). And WWII was an event, but a bit more than a 'property exemplification'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19508 Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
     Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions.
     From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
     A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge.
19509 The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]
     Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'.
     From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
     A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
168 To understand morality requires a soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: Good and evil are meaningless to things that have no soul.
     From: Plato (Letter Seven [c.352 BCE], 334)
     A reaction: That is presumably psuché, and hence includes plants. Soulless things can still function well, but obviously that is not 'meaningful' to them.