Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism', 'On the Senses' and 'On the General Idea of Proof Theory'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13827 Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments.
     From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13826 Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things.
     From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19508 Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
     Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions.
     From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
     A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge.
19509 The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]
     Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'.
     From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
     A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
20921 How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them?
     From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70)
     A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed.