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All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'talk' and 'On Recent German Literature. Fragments'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Thoughts are learnt through words, so language shows the limits and shape of our knowledge [Herder]
     Full Idea: If it is true that we cannot think without thoughts, and that we learn to think through words: then language gives the whole of human knowledge its limits and outline.
     From: Johann Gottfried Herder (On Recent German Literature. Fragments [1767], p.373), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy
     A reaction: Deomonstrating that Frege's famous 1884 'linguistic turn', immortalised by Dummett, was actually the continuation of a long focus on language in German philosophy. Non-verbal animals very obviously think.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski]
     Full Idea: People have asked me, 'How can you, a nominalist, do work in set theory and in logic, which are theories about things you do not believe in?' ...I believe that there is a value even in fairy tales and the study of fairy tales.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic
     A reaction: This is obviously an oversimplification. I don't think for a moment that Tarski literally believed that the study of fairy tales had as much value as the study of logic. Why do we have this particular logic, and not some other?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10)
     A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08)
     A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01)
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02)
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
     Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I
     A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment.