16 ideas
| 8766 | In much wisdom is much grief [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: In much wisdom is much grief. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.18) | |
| A reaction: If this is true, then the question is of what there is in wisdom that will compensate for the grief. Personally I doubt the whole claim. Some wisdom involves grief, but most of it involves pleasure, even when understanding of evil is the target. |
| 7494 | Laughter is mad; of mirth, what doeth it? [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, what doeth it? | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: Not much of an argument, but an interesting support for the extreme anti-hedonistic puritanical view. Most people would praise laughter as an end in itself, so 'what doeth it?' seems to miss the point. |
| 8767 | Sorrow is better than laughter [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 07.03) | |
| A reaction: This writer fails to see the good in laughter. If he did, he would have a more balanced view, and we could take this opinion more seriously. Theatre audiences always seem keen to hunt out jokes where none are intended. |
| 9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366) | |
| A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all. |
| 9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365) | |
| A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it. |
| 9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
| A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians. |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10) | |
| A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity. |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08) | |
| A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning. |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01) |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02) |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
| A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth. |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible... |
| 9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
| A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view. |
| 8765 | All is vanity, saith the Preacher [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: If we are swamped by vanity, then there is presumably no hope for the other virtues. A more balanced view would say that we should aim for a mean on the scale of self-esteem, which probably requires an effort to be objective about ourselves. |
| 8768 | Books are endless, and study is wearisome [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: Of making many books there is no end; and much study is weariness of the flesh. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 12.12) | |
| A reaction: Does anyone share my occasional sinking heart on entering a large library or bookshop? I truly believe that there is nothing better in the world than books. And yet, and yet... |
| 9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time. |