6410
|
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
|
|
Full Idea:
Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
|
|
From:
report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
|
|
A reaction:
This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.
|
10579
|
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
|
|
Full Idea:
Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass.
|
|
From:
Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08)
|
|
A reaction:
See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning.
|
10577
|
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
|
|
Full Idea:
Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential.
|
|
From:
Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01)
|
|
A reaction:
There's a shift here, from his own 'properties' to the 'intrinsic properties' of the abstracta. Presumably his own 'intrinsic' properties are not accidental. In fact, intrinsic properties tend to be essential properties, I think.
|
22601
|
Laissez-faire individualism doesn't work, especially in troublesome times [Keynes]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is obvious that an individualist society left to itself does not work well or even tolerably. The more troublesome the times, the worse does a laissez-faire system work.
|
|
From:
Maynard Keynes (The General Theory of Employment [1936]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7
|
|
A reaction:
I thought I was a Communitarian, but I may be a Keynesian Liberal, committed to a safety net welfare system. I haven't quite decided yet. Political philosophy is hopeless, if the ideas actually have to be implemented. What is the criterion of 'work'?
|