Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'Constructibility and Mathematical Existence' and 'works'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Chihara's programme is to replace talk of sets with talk of open sentences. Instead of speaking of the set of all cats, we talk about the open sentence 'x is a cat'.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.2
     A reaction: As Shapiro points out, this is following up Russell's view that sets should be replaced with talk of properties. Chihara is expressing it more linguistically. I'm in favour of any attempt to get rid of sets.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Chihara's system is a version of type theory. Translate thus: replace variables of sets of type n with level n variables over open sentences, replace membership/predication with satisfaction, and high quantifiers with constructability quantifiers.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4
We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Chihara's system is similar to simple type theory; he replaces each type with variables over open sentences, replaces membership (or predication) with satisfaction, and replaces quantifiers over level 1+ variables with constructability quantifiers.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.2
     A reaction: This is interesting for showing that type theory may not be dead. The revival of supposedly dead theories is the bread-and-butter of modern philosophy.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10)
     A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08)
     A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Chihara has proposal a modal primitive, a 'constructability quantifier'. Syntactically it behaves like an ordinary quantifier: Φ is a formula, and x a variable. Then (Cx)Φ is a formula, read as 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ'.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4
     A reaction: We only think natural numbers are infinite because we see no barrier to continuing to count, i.e. to construct new numbers. We accept reals when we know how to construct them. Etc. Sounds promising to me (though not to Shapiro).
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01)
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Levinas took 'first philosophy' to begin with seeing the vulnerable faces of others [Levinas, by Aho]
     Full Idea: Levinas forwarded a notion of 'ethics as first philosophy' that begins from the concete exposure and openness to 'the face' of the other, an experience of vulnerability and suffering that undercuts our ordinary egoistic and objectifying tendencies.
     From: report of Emmanuel Levinas (works [1956]) by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 1 'Existentialism'
     A reaction: Iris Murdoch speaks of seeing a falcon in flight as having a similar effect of diminishing the ego. If the main focus is on potential 'suffering' does this eventually cash out as utilitarianism? I bet not!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Levinas says Marxism is the replacement of individualist ethics, by solidarity and sociality [Levinas, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: For Levinas, Marxism is the absorption of the ethical in the socioeconomic, and so it is the disappearance of the face-to-face relation and the privileging of relations of solidarity and anonymous sociality, which he calls 'socialism'.
     From: report of Emmanuel Levinas (works [1956]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 1
     A reaction: Startling, if you are not used to this sort of thing. If you are in trouble, I should help you, not because you are you, or a human being, but because you are a member of my group? So what about the Good Samaritan? Or solidarity with humanity? Animals?