23 ideas
| 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) |
| 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23) |
| 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) | |
| A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'. |
| 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10) | |
| A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity. |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08) | |
| A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning. |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01) |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02) |
| 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic... |
| 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity. |
| 5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: Belief is the power of metarepresentation. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.3) | |
| A reaction: Hm. I have always defined belief as 'commitment to truth', and this definition leaves out both parts. Where is the commitment? If hope is another metarepresentation, how does it differ from belief? I imagine things, not believing them to be true. |
| 5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3) | |
| A reaction: Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief? |
| 5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: Representations are in the head, but their content is not; in this sense, the mind isn't in the head any more than stories (i.e. story contents) are in books. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.6) | |
| A reaction: This is the final consequence of Putnam's idea that meanings ain't in the head. Intentionality is an extraordinary bridge between the brain and the external world. The ontology of stories, and musical compositions, is one philosophy's deepest problems. |
| 5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: Some tasks (playing the piano, speaking foreign languages, playing fast sports) are best performed when the agent is largely unconscious of the details. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Ch.4 n16) | |
| A reaction: A significant point, but it supports the evolutionary view, which is that what matters is success, and consciousness will switch on or off, whichever promotes the activity best. |
| 5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The Representational Thesis of mind identifies the qualities of experience - qualia - with the properties objects are represented as having. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to challenge the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, of which I am very fond. Is 'looks beautiful' a property of an object? Is the feeling of anger a property of an object? Qualia are properties of brains? |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions. |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: Introspection has no phenomenology or, if it does, it always has the same phenomenology as the experience one is introspecting. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.4) | |
| A reaction: There is a difference between looking at a tree, and being aware of yourself looking at a tree. You can be faintly depressed, and then become aware that you are faintly depressed. He is nearly right. |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The 'problem' of introspection evaporates once one understands that it is not a process in which one looks inward. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
| A reaction: I take it that when we introspect we look at the contents of thoughts, which are representations of the external world, on the whole. But surely only the connections of those contents with memories can be seen inwardly? |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably brain events bring the world into the mind, so the world must be mentioned in explaining the mind. Maybe 'externalism' sounds grand, but is stating the boringly obvious. Explanations of mind need no mention of external particulars. |
| 5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
| Full Idea: My thesis is that all mental facts are representational facts, and that all representational facts are facts about informational functions. | |
| From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Prol) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the thesis seems a bit difficult to disagree with, but that a fact is 'represented' may not be the essence of that fact. The biggest mystery is the content, not its representation. And everything is 'information' about everything else. |
| 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with. |
| 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things. |
| 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault. |