Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'Notes on Comments by Fardella' and 'Moral Relativism'

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9 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism

10580	Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
	Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10)
	A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics

10579	Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
	Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08)
	A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete

10577	Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
	Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01)

10578	We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
	Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02)

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual

13160	To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3)
	A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13161	Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif)
	A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

22449	When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
	Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
	A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

22451	All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
	A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

22452	Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
	Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
	A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.