18904
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'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
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Full Idea:
Sommers took the 'predicable' terms of any language to come in logically charged pairs. Examples might be red/nonred, massive/massless, tied/untied, in the house/not in the house. The idea that terms can be negated was essential for such pairing.
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From:
report of Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 2
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A reaction:
If, as Rumfitt says, we learn affirmation and negation as a single linguistic operation, this would fit well with it, though Rumfitt doubtless (as a fan of classical logic) prefers to negation sentences.
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18895
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Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
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Full Idea:
What would a 'laws of thought' logic that cast light on natural language deductive thinking be like? Such a logic must be variable-free, conforming to normal syntax, and its modes of reasoning must be transparent, to make them virtually instantaneous.
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From:
Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'How We')
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A reaction:
This is the main motivation for Fred Sommers's creation of modern term logic. Even if you are up to your neck in modern symbolic logic (which I'm not), you have to find this idea appealing. You can't leave it to the psychologists.
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8729
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Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Intuitionists in mathematics deny excluded middle, because it is symptomatic of faith in the transcendent existence of mathematical objects and/or the truth of mathematical statements.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2)
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A reaction:
There are other problems with excluded middle, such as vagueness, but on the whole I, as a card-carrying 'realist', am committed to the law of excluded middle.
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18893
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Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
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Full Idea:
Modern predicate logic's methods of justification, which involve translation into an artificial quantificational idiom, offer no clues to how the average person, knowing no logic and adhering to the vernacular, is so logically adept.
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From:
Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], Intro)
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A reaction:
Of course, people are very logically adept when the argument is simple (because, I guess, they can test it against the world), but not at all good when the reasoning becomes more complex. We do, though, reason in ordinary natural language.
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18903
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Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
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Full Idea:
If there is one idea that is the keystone of the edifice that constitutes Sommers's united philosophy it is that terms are the linguistic entities subject to negation in the most basic sense. It is a very old idea, tending to be rejected in modern times.
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From:
report of Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 2
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A reaction:
Negation in modern logic is an operator applied to sentences, typically writing '¬Fa', which denies that F is predicated of a, with Fa being an atomic sentence. Do we say 'not(Stan is happy)', or 'not-Stan is happy', or 'Stan is not-happy'? Third one?
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18894
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Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
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Full Idea:
We organise our concepts of predicability on a hierarchical tree. At the top are terms like 'interesting', 'exists', 'talked about', which are predicable of anything. At the bottom are names, and in between are predicables of some things and not others.
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From:
Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Category')
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A reaction:
The heirarchy seem be arranged simply by the scope of the predicate. 'Tallest' is predicable of anything in principle, but only of a few things in practice. Is 'John Doe' a name? What is 'cosmic' predicable of? Challenging!
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8763
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The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
It is surely wise to identify the positions in the natural numbers structure with their counterparts in the integer, rational, real and complex number structures.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2)
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A reaction:
The point is that this might be denied, since 3, 3/1, 3.00.., and -3*i^2 are all arrived at by different methods of construction. Natural 3 has a predecessor, but real 3 doesn't. I agree, intuitively, with Shapiro. Russell (1919) disagreed.
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8762
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Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Zermelo said that for each number n, its successor is the singleton of n, so 3 is {{{null}}}, and 1 is not a member of 3. Von Neumann said each number n is the set of numbers less than n, so 3 is {null,{null},{null,{null}}}, and 1 is a member of 3.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2)
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A reaction:
See Idea 645 - Zermelo could save Plato from the criticisms of Aristotle! These two accounts are cited by opponents of the set-theoretical account of numbers, because it seems impossible to arbitrate between them.
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8749
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Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Term Formalism is the view that mathematics is just about characters or symbols - the systems of numerals and other linguistic forms. ...This will cover integers and rational numbers, but what are real numbers supposed to be, if they lack names?
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.1)
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A reaction:
Real numbers (such as pi and root-2) have infinite decimal expansions, so we can start naming those. We could also start giving names like 'Harry' to other reals, though it might take a while. OK, I give up.
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8750
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Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Game Formalism likens mathematics to chess, where the 'content' of mathematics is exhausted by the rules of operating with its language. ...This, however, leaves the problem of why the mathematical games are so useful to the sciences.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.2)
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A reaction:
This thought pushes us towards structuralism. It could still be a game, but one we learned from observing nature, which plays its own games. Chess is, after all, modelled on warfare.
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8753
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Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Critics commonly complain that the intuitionist restrictions cripple the mathematician. On the other hand, intuitionist mathematics allows for many potentially important distinctions not available in classical mathematics, and is often more subtle.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.1)
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A reaction:
The main way in which it cripples is its restriction on talk of infinity ('Cantor's heaven'), which was resented by Hilbert. Since high-level infinities are interesting, it would be odd if we were not allowed to discuss them.
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8731
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Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
I classify conceptualists according to what they say about properties or concepts. If someone classified properties as existing independent of language I would classify her as a realist in ontology of mathematics. Or they may be idealists or nominalists.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 2.2.1)
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A reaction:
In other words, Shapiro wants to eliminate 'conceptualist' as a useful label in philosophy of mathematics. He's probably right. All thought involves concepts, but that doesn't produce a conceptualist theory of, say, football.
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7667
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There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
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Full Idea:
Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
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From:
report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
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A reaction:
This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
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