45 ideas
4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason says no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise, even though in most cases these reasons cannot be known to us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §32) | |
A reaction: I think of this as my earliest philosophical perception, a childish rebellion against being told that there was 'no reason' for something. My intuition tells me that it is correct, and the foundation of ontology and truth. Don't ask me to justify it! |
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The ban on 'impredicative' definitions says you can't define a class in terms of a totality to which that class must be seen as belonging. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: So that would be defining 'citizen' in terms of the community to which the citizen belongs? If you are asked to define 'community' and 'citizen' together, where do you start? But how else can it be done? Russell's Reducibility aimed to block this. |
2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every body is sensitive to everything in the universe, so that one who saw everything could read in each body what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and will happen. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §61) |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility avoids impredicativity, by asserting that for any predicate of given arguments defined by quantifying over higher-order functions or classes, there is another co-extensive but predicative function of the same type of arguments. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: Eventually the axiom seemed too arbitrary, and was dropped. Linsky's book explores it. |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Intuitionists in mathematics deny excluded middle, because it is symptomatic of faith in the transcendent existence of mathematical objects and/or the truth of mathematical statements. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: There are other problems with excluded middle, such as vagueness, but on the whole I, as a card-carrying 'realist', am committed to the law of excluded middle. |
2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We judge to be false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §31) |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The theory of definite descriptions may eliminate apparent commitment to such entities as the present King of France, but certainly not to the present Queen of England. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 7.3) |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: With the principle of extensionality anything true of one propositional functions will be true of every coextensive one. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6.3) |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: It is surely wise to identify the positions in the natural numbers structure with their counterparts in the integer, rational, real and complex number structures. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2) | |
A reaction: The point is that this might be denied, since 3, 3/1, 3.00.., and -3*i^2 are all arrived at by different methods of construction. Natural 3 has a predecessor, but real 3 doesn't. I agree, intuitively, with Shapiro. Russell (1919) disagreed. |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A sequence a1,a2,... of rational numbers is 'Cauchy' if for each rational number ε>0 there is a natural number N such that for all natural numbers m, n, if m>N and n>N then -ε < am - an < ε. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.2 n4) | |
A reaction: The sequence is 'Cauchy' if N exists. |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: There is a dedicated contingent who hold that the category of 'categories' is the proper foundation for mathematics. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.3 n7) | |
A reaction: He cites Lawvere (1966) and McLarty (1993), the latter presenting the view as a form of structuralism. I would say that the concept of a category will need further explication, and probably reduce to either sets or relations or properties. |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Zermelo said that for each number n, its successor is the singleton of n, so 3 is {{{null}}}, and 1 is not a member of 3. Von Neumann said each number n is the set of numbers less than n, so 3 is {null,{null},{null,{null}}}, and 1 is a member of 3. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2) | |
A reaction: See Idea 645 - Zermelo could save Plato from the criticisms of Aristotle! These two accounts are cited by opponents of the set-theoretical account of numbers, because it seems impossible to arbitrate between them. |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The structuralist vigorously rejects any sort of ontological independence among the natural numbers; the essence of a natural number is its relations to other natural numbers. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to place the emphasis on ordinals (what order?) rather than on cardinality (how many?). I am strongly inclined to think that this is the correct view, though you can't really have relations if there is nothing to relate. |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A 'system' is a collection of objects with certain relations among them; a 'pattern' or 'structure' is the abstract form of a system, highlighting the interrelationships and ignoring any features they do not affect how they relate to other objects. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.1) | |
A reaction: Note that 'ignoring' features is a psychological account of abstraction, which (thanks to Frege and Geach) is supposed to be taboo - but which I suspect is actually indispensable in any proper account of thought and concepts. |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The problem for logicism was to find definitions of the primitive notions of Peano's theory, number, successor and 0, in terms of logical notions, so that the postulates could then be derived by logic alone. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 7) | |
A reaction: Both Frege and Russell defined numbers as equivalence classes. Successor is easily defined (in various ways) in set theory. An impossible set can exemplify zero. The trouble for logicism is this all relies on sets. |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The higher types are needed for intensional phenomena, cases where the same class is picked out by distinct propositional functions. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6.4) | |
A reaction: I take it that in this way 'x is renate' can be distinguished from 'x is cordate', a task nowadays performed by possible worlds. |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The types is 'ramified' because there are further differences between the type of a function defined in terms of a quantifier ranging over other functions and the type of those other functions, despite the functions applying to the same simple type. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it evidently created difficulties for dealing with actual mathematics, and Ramsey showed how you could manage without the ramifications. |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The original ramified theory of types ...furthern subdivides each of the types of the 'simple' theory according to the range of the bound variables used in the definition of each propositional function. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6) | |
A reaction: For a non-intiate like me it certainly sounds disappointing that such a bold and neat theory because a tangle of complications. Ramsey and Russell in the 1920s seem to have dropped the ramifications. |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The thesis that principles of arithmetic are derivable from the laws of logic runs against a now common view that logic itself has no ontology. There are no particular logical objects. From this perspective logicism is a non-starter. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This criticism strikes me as utterly devastating. There are two routes to go: prove that logic does have an ontology of objects (what would they be?), or - better - deny that arithmetic contains any 'objects'. Or give up logicism. |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: It is often thought that Logicism was a failure, because after Frege's contradiction, Russell required obviously nonlogical principles, in order to develop mathematics. The axioms of Reducibility, Infinity and Choice are cited. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6) | |
A reaction: Infinity and Choice remain as axioms of the standard ZFC system of set theory, which is why set theory is always assumed to be 'up to its neck' in ontological commitments. Linsky argues that Russell saw ontology in logic. |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: ZF set theory is seen as a rival to logicism as a foundational scheme. Set theory is for those who have given up the project of reducing mathematics to logic. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably there are other rivals. Set theory has lots of ontological commitments. One could start at the other end, and investigate the basic ontological commitments of arithmetic. I have no idea what those might be. |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Term Formalism is the view that mathematics is just about characters or symbols - the systems of numerals and other linguistic forms. ...This will cover integers and rational numbers, but what are real numbers supposed to be, if they lack names? | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.1) | |
A reaction: Real numbers (such as pi and root-2) have infinite decimal expansions, so we can start naming those. We could also start giving names like 'Harry' to other reals, though it might take a while. OK, I give up. |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Game Formalism likens mathematics to chess, where the 'content' of mathematics is exhausted by the rules of operating with its language. ...This, however, leaves the problem of why the mathematical games are so useful to the sciences. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.2) | |
A reaction: This thought pushes us towards structuralism. It could still be a game, but one we learned from observing nature, which plays its own games. Chess is, after all, modelled on warfare. |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The Deductivist version of formalism (sometimes called 'if-thenism') says that the practice of mathematics consists of determining logical consequences of otherwise uninterpreted axioms. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [Hilbert is the source] More plausible than Term or Game Formalism (qv). It still leaves the question of why it seems applicable to nature, and why those particular axioms might be chosen. In some sense, though, it is obviously right. |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Critics commonly complain that the intuitionist restrictions cripple the mathematician. On the other hand, intuitionist mathematics allows for many potentially important distinctions not available in classical mathematics, and is often more subtle. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.1) | |
A reaction: The main way in which it cripples is its restriction on talk of infinity ('Cantor's heaven'), which was resented by Hilbert. Since high-level infinities are interesting, it would be odd if we were not allowed to discuss them. |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: I classify conceptualists according to what they say about properties or concepts. If someone classified properties as existing independent of language I would classify her as a realist in ontology of mathematics. Or they may be idealists or nominalists. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: In other words, Shapiro wants to eliminate 'conceptualist' as a useful label in philosophy of mathematics. He's probably right. All thought involves concepts, but that doesn't produce a conceptualist theory of, say, football. |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A definition of a mathematical entity is 'impredicative' if it refers to a collection that contains the defined entity. The definition of 'least upper bound' is impredicative as it refers to upper bounds and characterizes a member of this set. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The big question is whether mathematics can live with impredicative definitions, or whether they threaten to be viciously circular, and undermine the whole enterprise. |
7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Leibnizians with their monads have constructed an incomprehensible hypothesis. They have spiritualized matter rather than materialising the soul. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Julien Offray de La Mettrie - Machine Man p.3 | |
A reaction: I agree with La Mettrie. This disagreement shows, I think, how important the problem of interaction between mind and body was in the century after Descartes. Drastic action seemed needed to bridge the gap, one way or the other. |
11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: In the end Leibniz dethroned Aristotelian continuants, seen as imperfect from his point of view, in favour of monads. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 3.1 | |
A reaction: I take the 'continuants' to be either the 'ultimate subject of predication' (in 'Categories'), or 'essences' (in 'Metaphysics'). Since monads seem to be mental (presumably to explain the powers of things), this strikes me as a bit mad. |
7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Can you really maintain that a drop of urine is an infinity of monads, and that each one of these has ideas, however obscure, of the entire universe? | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Francois-Marie Voltaire - works Vol 22:434 | |
A reaction: Monads are a bit like Christian theology - if you meet them cold they seem totally ridiculous, but if you meet them after ten years of careful preliminary study they make (apparently) complete sense. Defenders of panpsychism presumably like them. |
12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is never clear in the 'Monadologie' how exactly the world of extended bodies is related to the world of simple substances, the world of non-extended and mind-like monads. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9 | |
A reaction: Leibniz was always going to hit the interaction problem, as soon as he started giving an increasingly spiritual account of what a substance, and hence marginalising the 'force' which had held centre-stage earlier on. Presumably they are 'parallel'. |
19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A monad's natural changes come from an internal principle, ...but there must be diversity in that which changes, which produces the specification and variety of substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §11-12) | |
A reaction: You don't have to like monads to like this generalisation (and Perkins says Leibniz had a genius for generalisations). Metaphysics must give an account of change. Succeeding time-slices etc explain nothing. Principle and substance must meet. |
19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The general name 'monad' or 'entelechy' may suffice for those substances which have nothing but perception and appetition; the name 'souls' may be reserved for those having perception that is more distinct and accompanied by memory. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §19) | |
A reaction: It is basic to the study of Leibniz that you don't think monads are full-blown consciousnesses. He isn't really a panpsychist, because the level of mental activity is so minimal. There seem to be degrees of monadhood. |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Rather than directly constructing properties as sets of objects and proving neat facts about properties by proxy, we can assert biconditionals, such as that an object has a property if and only if it is in a certain set. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 7.6) | |
A reaction: Linsky is describing Russell's method of logical construction. I'm not clear what is gained by this move, but at least it is a variant of the usual irritating expression of properties as sets of objects. |
7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another. |
17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §09) | |
A reaction: From this it follows that if two things really are indiscernible, then we must say that they are one thing. He says monads all differ from one another. People certainly do. Leibniz must say this of electrons. How can he know this? |
2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of truths: of reasoning and of facts. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposites impossible. Facts are contingent and their opposites possible. A necessary truth is known by analysis. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §33) |
9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: At the end of the analytical method in mathematics there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given. Moreover there are axioms and postulates, in short, primitive principles, which cannot be demonstrated and do not need demonstration. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §35) | |
A reaction: My view is that we do not know such principles when we apprehend them in isolation. I would call them 'intuitions'. They only ascend to the status of knowledge when the mathematics is extended and derived from them, and found to work. |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Rationalism is a long-standing school that can be characterized as an attempt to extend the perceived methodology of mathematics to all of knowledge. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Sometimes called 'Descartes's Dream', or the 'Enlightenment Project', the dream of proving everything. Within maths, Hilbert's Programme aimed for the same certainty. Idea 22 is the motto for the opposition to this approach. |
2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: When we expect it to be day tomorrow, we all behave as empiricists, because until now it has always happened thus. The astronomer alone knows this by reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §28) |
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If a conscious machine were increased in size, one might enter it like a mill, but we should only see the parts impinging on one another; we should not see anything which would explain a perception. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §17) | |
A reaction: A wonderful image for capturing a widely held intuition. It seems to motivate Colin McGinn's 'Mysterianism'. The trouble is Leibniz didn't think big/small enough. Down at the level of molecules it might become obvious what a perception is. 'Might'. |
19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstraction that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called "I" and enable us to consider that this or that is in us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §30) | |
A reaction: For Leibniz, necessary truth can only be known a priori. Sense experience won't reveal the self, as Hume observed. We evidently 'abstract' the idea of 'I' from the nature of a priori thought. Animals have no self (or morals) for this reason. |
12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], (opening)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: Thus in one sentence Leibniz gives us a theory of natural elements, and an account of atoms. This kind of speculation got metaphysics a bad name when science unravelled a more accurate picture. The bones must be picked out of Leibniz. |
2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From all the possible universes God chooses this one to obtain as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible; that is, it is the means of obtaining the greatest perfection possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §58) |
2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God alone (or the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §45) |