55 ideas
| 8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: There are three ways to give an account: 1) 'I deny it' - this earns a failing mark if the fact is really Moorean. 2) 'I analyse it thus'. 3) 'I accept it as primitive'. Not every account is an analysis. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many') | |
| A reaction: I prefer Shoemaker's view (Idea 8559). Personally I think 1) should be employed more often than it is (it is a very misunderstood approach). 3) has been overused in recent years (e.g. by Davidson and McGinn). |
| 8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Intuitionists in mathematics deny excluded middle, because it is symptomatic of faith in the transcendent existence of mathematical objects and/or the truth of mathematical statements. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: There are other problems with excluded middle, such as vagueness, but on the whole I, as a card-carrying 'realist', am committed to the law of excluded middle. |
| 8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: It is surely wise to identify the positions in the natural numbers structure with their counterparts in the integer, rational, real and complex number structures. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2) | |
| A reaction: The point is that this might be denied, since 3, 3/1, 3.00.., and -3*i^2 are all arrived at by different methods of construction. Natural 3 has a predecessor, but real 3 doesn't. I agree, intuitively, with Shapiro. Russell (1919) disagreed. |
| 18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: A sequence a1,a2,... of rational numbers is 'Cauchy' if for each rational number ε>0 there is a natural number N such that for all natural numbers m, n, if m>N and n>N then -ε < am - an < ε. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.2 n4) | |
| A reaction: The sequence is 'Cauchy' if N exists. |
| 8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: There is a dedicated contingent who hold that the category of 'categories' is the proper foundation for mathematics. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.3 n7) | |
| A reaction: He cites Lawvere (1966) and McLarty (1993), the latter presenting the view as a form of structuralism. I would say that the concept of a category will need further explication, and probably reduce to either sets or relations or properties. |
| 8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Zermelo said that for each number n, its successor is the singleton of n, so 3 is {{{null}}}, and 1 is not a member of 3. Von Neumann said each number n is the set of numbers less than n, so 3 is {null,{null},{null,{null}}}, and 1 is a member of 3. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 645 - Zermelo could save Plato from the criticisms of Aristotle! These two accounts are cited by opponents of the set-theoretical account of numbers, because it seems impossible to arbitrate between them. |
| 8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: The structuralist vigorously rejects any sort of ontological independence among the natural numbers; the essence of a natural number is its relations to other natural numbers. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to place the emphasis on ordinals (what order?) rather than on cardinality (how many?). I am strongly inclined to think that this is the correct view, though you can't really have relations if there is nothing to relate. |
| 8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: A 'system' is a collection of objects with certain relations among them; a 'pattern' or 'structure' is the abstract form of a system, highlighting the interrelationships and ignoring any features they do not affect how they relate to other objects. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.1) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'ignoring' features is a psychological account of abstraction, which (thanks to Frege and Geach) is supposed to be taboo - but which I suspect is actually indispensable in any proper account of thought and concepts. |
| 8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: The thesis that principles of arithmetic are derivable from the laws of logic runs against a now common view that logic itself has no ontology. There are no particular logical objects. From this perspective logicism is a non-starter. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: This criticism strikes me as utterly devastating. There are two routes to go: prove that logic does have an ontology of objects (what would they be?), or - better - deny that arithmetic contains any 'objects'. Or give up logicism. |
| 8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Term Formalism is the view that mathematics is just about characters or symbols - the systems of numerals and other linguistic forms. ...This will cover integers and rational numbers, but what are real numbers supposed to be, if they lack names? | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.1) | |
| A reaction: Real numbers (such as pi and root-2) have infinite decimal expansions, so we can start naming those. We could also start giving names like 'Harry' to other reals, though it might take a while. OK, I give up. |
| 8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Game Formalism likens mathematics to chess, where the 'content' of mathematics is exhausted by the rules of operating with its language. ...This, however, leaves the problem of why the mathematical games are so useful to the sciences. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.2) | |
| A reaction: This thought pushes us towards structuralism. It could still be a game, but one we learned from observing nature, which plays its own games. Chess is, after all, modelled on warfare. |
| 8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: The Deductivist version of formalism (sometimes called 'if-thenism') says that the practice of mathematics consists of determining logical consequences of otherwise uninterpreted axioms. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.2) | |
| A reaction: [Hilbert is the source] More plausible than Term or Game Formalism (qv). It still leaves the question of why it seems applicable to nature, and why those particular axioms might be chosen. In some sense, though, it is obviously right. |
| 8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Critics commonly complain that the intuitionist restrictions cripple the mathematician. On the other hand, intuitionist mathematics allows for many potentially important distinctions not available in classical mathematics, and is often more subtle. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: The main way in which it cripples is its restriction on talk of infinity ('Cantor's heaven'), which was resented by Hilbert. Since high-level infinities are interesting, it would be odd if we were not allowed to discuss them. |
| 8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: I classify conceptualists according to what they say about properties or concepts. If someone classified properties as existing independent of language I would classify her as a realist in ontology of mathematics. Or they may be idealists or nominalists. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 2.2.1) | |
| A reaction: In other words, Shapiro wants to eliminate 'conceptualist' as a useful label in philosophy of mathematics. He's probably right. All thought involves concepts, but that doesn't produce a conceptualist theory of, say, football. |
| 8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: A definition of a mathematical entity is 'impredicative' if it refers to a collection that contains the defined entity. The definition of 'least upper bound' is impredicative as it refers to upper bounds and characterizes a member of this set. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: The big question is whether mathematics can live with impredicative definitions, or whether they threaten to be viciously circular, and undermine the whole enterprise. |
| 8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Supervenience is a stripped down form of reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence, claims of ontological priority, or claims of translatability. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: Interesting. It implies that the honest reductionist (i.e. me) should begin by asserting supervience, and only at a second stage go on to deny a bit of existence, loudly affirm priorities, and offer translations. Honest toil. |
| 8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: Not everyone agrees on this. This says if either A or B change, the change is reflected in the other one. But the other view is of one-way dependence. A only changes if B changes, but B can also make changes that don't affect A. |
| 8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Final definition of 'Materialism': Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; and two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
| A reaction: This would presumably allow for an anomalous monist/property dualist view of mind, but not full dualism. But if there are no psychophysical laws, what stops the mental changing while the physical remains the same? |
| 8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Universals and properties are different because a universal is supposed to be wholly present wherever it is instantiated. A property, by contrast, is spread around. The property of being a donkey is partly present wherever there is a donkey. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: No mention of tropes. The claim that universals are widespread, and yet must be instantiated, is dealt with by Lewis's commitment to the existence of possible donkeys. |
| 10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Lewis argues that there are natural properties, which makes various analyses possible, especially of similarity in intrinsic respects. Naturalness comes in degrees, with perfectly natural properties being the limiting case. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 4 | |
| A reaction: This sounds to be the wrong way round. We don't start with similarities and work back to natural properties. We encounter natural properties (through their causal action), and these give rise to the similarities. |
| 16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
| Full Idea: For Lewis natural properties are important for their role in making language and thought determinate: principles of charity or humanity tell us to attribute natural properties to predicates wherever possible, break underdetermination of their reference. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 3.8 | |
| A reaction: Lewis always seems to find reasons in semantics or logic for his metaphysics, instead of in the science. Lewis ends up with 'folk' natural properties, instead of accurate ones. |
| 8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Reference consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This is a surprising conclusion for Lewis to reach, having started from properties as any old set members (see Idea 8572). There are references to intentional objects, such as 'there should have been someone on duty'. |
| 8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Where my cat (Bruce) ends, there the density of matter, the relative abundance of chemical elements, abruptly change. Bruce is also a locus of causal chains, which traces back to natural properties. Natural properties belong to well demarcated things. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This is an amazingly convoluted way to define natural properties in terms of the classes they generate, but it seems obvious to me that the properties are logically prior to the classes. |
| 8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: One thing that makes for naturalness of a property is that it is a property belonging exclusively to well-demarcated things (like my cat Bruce, who is a locus of causal chains). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 8557. Well-demarcated things may also have gerrymandered properties that are parts of 'arbitrary Boolean compounds' (Lewis). Why not make use of the causal chains to identify the properties? |
| 8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The reason natural properties feature in the contents of our attitudes is that naturalness is part of what it is to feature therein. We aren't built to take a special interest in natural properties, or that we call them natural if they are interesting. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Evolution never features in Lewis's metaphysics. I would have thought we were very much built to focus on natural properties. This sounds odd, and gives no help in distinguishing natural properties from all our other daft contents. |
| 15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Lewis proposed that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], p.355-7) by David Lewis - Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) IX | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'natural', 'property' and 'intrinsic'! Presumably there are natural extrinsic facts, in naturally necessary relationships. If all natural properties are powers, they would have to be intrinsic. Extrinsics would be derivative. |
| 15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps we could call a property 'perfectly' natural if its members are all and only those things that share some one universal, ...where the natural properties would be the ones whose sharing makes for resemblance, and the ones relevant to causal powers. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: This is Lewis fishing for an account of properties that does a bit better than the mere recourse to set theory (which he intuitively favours) seems to do. He remains neutral about the ontological status of a universal (though he prefers nominalism). |
| 7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
| Full Idea: David Lewis has produced an important theory of properties as sets of actual and possible objects. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §12.2 | |
| A reaction: The notion that a property is an 'object' sounds wrong, as it is too passive. It also seems to allow for the possibility of uninstantiated properties existing, where properties are presumably always 'of' something. |
| 8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Any class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and indescribable in thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in characterizing the world, is nevertheless a property. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: I much prefer, at the very least, the sparse approach of Armstrong, and in fact would vote for Shoemaker's highly physical view. Lewis proceeds after this to try to pick out the properties that really matter. |
| 18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: There are so many properties that those specifiable in English, or in the brain's language of synaptic interconnections and neural spikes, could only be an infinitesimal minority. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: Thus there are innumerable properties that must lack predicates. But there are also innumerable predicates that correspond to no real properties. I conclude that properties and predicates have very little in common. Job done. |
| 8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We need properties, sometimes natural and sometimes not, to provide an adequate supply of semantic values for linguistic expressions. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: A characteristically twentieth century approach, which I find puzzling. We don't need a Loch Ness Monster in order to use the term 'Loch Ness Monster'. Lewis appears to have been a pupil of Quine... He was not, though, a Predicate Nominalist. |
| 14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Lewis has a preference for a nominalist conception of properties as classes of possible and actual concrete particulars. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects II.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm sympathetic to nominalism, but still can't swallow the idea that a property like redness is nothing more than a collection of particulars, the red things. This class will include all sorts of non-red features. |
| 15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: According to Lewis's conception, the causal powers of a property are constituted by its patterned relations to other properties in the particular Humean mosaic that is the actual world. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Hawthorne - Causal Structuralism Intro | |
| A reaction: I just can't grasp this as a serious proposal. Relations cannot be the bottom line in explanation of the world. What are the relata? I take powers to be primitive. |
| 8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: Shoemaker, who endorses a causal account of properties, has a go at this problem in Idea 8557. The property of being massive is more likely to be causal than existing fifty years after D-Day. Lewis attempts later to address the problem. |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I suspend judgement about universals themselves; I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: This seems surprising (but admirable) in a great metaphysician, but I suppose it is symptomatic of the Humean approach to metaphysics. In the light of Ideas 3989 and 3990, I would have expected Lewis to deny universals. He probably did. |
| 21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: For Lewis, we can see the purpose of physics as being to discover what universals there actually are. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics Intro | |
| A reaction: It seems that Lewis uses the word 'property' to mean predicates, which consist of a multitude of sets, while universals are the properties that naturally exist and cut nature at the joints . Infuriating, because the other way around seems better. |
| 8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The transformed problem of One over Many (in terms of predication, rather than sameness of type) deserves our neglect. The ostrich that will not look at it is a wise bird indeed. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many') | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Armstrong, and defends Quine. The remark moves Ostrich Nominalism from the category of joke to the category of respectable. I think I side with Armstrong. How is predication primitive if it has two components? |
| 8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things. (Note: this resembles the doctrine of Class Nominalism, but I do not claim to solve the One Over Many problem by this means, far from it). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: Lewis remains neutral about the traditional question of whether universals exist. What does he mean by "is" in his assertion? Identity, predication or class membership? I think Lewis is open to many of the objections to Class Nominalism. |
| 8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Moderate Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism (in its present form) seem to me to be a single theory presented in different styles. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop' n9) | |
| A reaction: Lewis has earlier endorsed a cautious form of Class Nominalism (Idea 8570). Which comes first, having a resemblance, or being in a class? Quine seems to make resemblance basic (Idea 8486), but Lewis seems to make the class basic (Idea 8572). |
| 8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Rationalism is a long-standing school that can be characterized as an attempt to extend the perceived methodology of mathematics to all of knowledge. | |
| From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Sometimes called 'Descartes's Dream', or the 'Enlightenment Project', the dream of proving everything. Within maths, Hilbert's Programme aimed for the same certainty. Idea 22 is the motto for the opposition to this approach. |
| 8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Psychophysical identity is a two-way street: if all mental properties are physical, then some physical properties are mental; but then all physical properties might be mental, or every property of everything might be both physical and mental. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
| A reaction: I suspect that this is the thought that has impressed Galen Strawson. The whole story seems to include the existence of 'mental properties' as a distinct category. This line of thought strikes me as a serious misunderstanding. |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We need natural properties, so that the principle of charity will impute a bias towards believing that things are green rather than grue, and towards a basic desire for long life, rather than long-life-unless-one-was-born-on-a-Monday.... | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Lewis always seems to be approaching things from the wrong end. We don't need properties so that we can attribute charity, so that we can interpret. We interpret, because we can be charitable, because we all experience natural properties. |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Unlike principles of crude charity, sophisticated principles of charity call for imputations of error in the subject if he has lived in deceptive conditions. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This begs lots of questions about how you decide conditions are 'deceptive' if you have not yet embarked on your radical interpretation of the subject. Davidson's point still stands, that imputing truth must be the normal procedure. |
| 7127 | If men are good you should keep promises, but they aren't, so you needn't [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: If all men were good, promising-breaking would not be good, but because they are bad and do not keep their promises to you, you likewise do not have to keep yours to them. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.18) | |
| A reaction: A rather depressing proposal to get your promise-breaking in first, based on the pessimistic view that people cannot be improved. The subsequent history of ethics in Europe showed Machiavelli to be wrong. Gentlemen began to keep their word. |
| 6309 | The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.11) | |
| A reaction: We may be wondering, since 1945, whether a good army is any longer essential, but it would be a foolish modern state which didn't at least form a strong alliance with a state which had a strong army. Fertile land is a huge benefit to a state. |
| 6305 | To retain a conquered state, wipe out the ruling family, and preserve everything else [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: If a ruler acquires a state and is determined to keep it, he observes two cautions: he wipes out the family of their long-established princes; and he does not change either their laws or their taxes; in a short time they will unite with his old princedom. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This nicely illustrates the firmness of purpose for which Machiavelli has become a byword. The question is whether Machiavelli had enough empirical evidence to support this induction. The British in India seem to have been successful without it. |
| 6308 | A sensible conqueror does all his harmful deeds immediately, because people soon forget [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: A prudent conqueror makes a list of all the harmful deeds he must do, and does them all at once, so that he need not repeat them every day, which then makes men feel secure, and gains their support by treating them well. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This might work for a new government in a democracy, or a new boss in a business. It sounds horribly true; dreadful deeds done a long time ago can be completely forgotten, as when reformed criminals become celebrities. |
| 6306 | People are vengeful, so be generous to them, or destroy them [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: Men should be either treated generously or destroyed, because they take revenge for slight injuries. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like good advice, and works quite well in school teaching too. It seems like advice drawn from the growth of the Roman Empire, rather than from dealing with sophisticated and educated people. |
| 6307 | A desire to conquer, and men who do it, are always praised, or not blamed [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: It is very natural and normal to wish to conquer, and when men do it who can, they always will be praised, or not blamed. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This view seems shocking to us, but it seems to me that this was a widely held view up until the time of Nietzsche, but came to a swift end with the invention of the machine gun in about 1885, followed by the heavy bomber and atomic bomb. |
| 7486 | Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion [Machiavelli, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion. | |
| From: report of Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24 | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, he seems to have done it by saying that ideals are irrelevant to politics, but gradually secular ideals crept back in (sometimes disastrously). A balance needs to be struck on idealism. |
| 8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A counterfactual can be said to 'backtrack' if it can be said that if the present were different a different past would have led up to it (rather than if the present were different, the same past would have had a different outcome). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: A nice clear definition of a concept which is important in Lewis's analysis of causation. In the current context he is concerned with elucidation of determinism and materialism. I would say (intuitively) that all counterfactuals backtrack. |
| 8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: My counterfactual analysis of causation needs counterfactuals that avoid backtracking; else the analysis faces fatal counterexamples involving epiphenomenal side-effects or cases of causal preemption. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
| A reaction: The concept of true epiphenomena (absolutely no causal powers) strikes me as bogus. |
| 15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Physics aspires to give an inventory of natural properties. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: The sort of beautifully simple remark by which philosophers ought to earn a good living in the intellectual community. Come on physicists - this is all we want! Presumably the inventory will include an account of how they all work. |
| 8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Physics must not just discover laws and causal explanations. In putting forward as comprehensive theories that recognise only a limited range of natural properties, physics proposes inventories of the natural properties instantiated in our world. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
| A reaction: Physics does this job extremely well, offering things like force, spin, charge that are the building blocks for their theories. There is metaphysics at the heart of physics, unavoidably. |
| 8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system (or, in case of ties, in every ideal system). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
| A reaction: Reminiscent of Peirce's view of truth (Idea 7661). This wouldn't seem to eliminate the danger of regularities with underlying causes ending up as laws (day causes night). Or very trivial regularities ending up as laws. |