32 ideas
343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
Full Idea: The unexamined life is not worth living for men. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 38a | |
A reaction: I wonder why? I can see Nietzsche offering aristocratic heroes and dancers as counterexamples. Compare Idea 3798. |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
Full Idea: The main and the original motivation for the 'possible worlds analysis' - and the way it clarified modal logic - was that it enabled modal logic to be treated by the same set theoretic techniques of model theory used successfully in extensional logic. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18) | |
A reaction: So they should be ascribed the same value that we attribute to classical model theory, whatever that is. |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Intuitionists in mathematics deny excluded middle, because it is symptomatic of faith in the transcendent existence of mathematical objects and/or the truth of mathematical statements. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: There are other problems with excluded middle, such as vagueness, but on the whole I, as a card-carrying 'realist', am committed to the law of excluded middle. |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Two totally distinct 'historical chains' that be sheer accident assign the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of the referents. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.08 n9) | |
A reaction: A nice puzzle for his own theory. 'What's you name?' 'Alice, and Alice!' |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: It is surely wise to identify the positions in the natural numbers structure with their counterparts in the integer, rational, real and complex number structures. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2) | |
A reaction: The point is that this might be denied, since 3, 3/1, 3.00.., and -3*i^2 are all arrived at by different methods of construction. Natural 3 has a predecessor, but real 3 doesn't. I agree, intuitively, with Shapiro. Russell (1919) disagreed. |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A sequence a1,a2,... of rational numbers is 'Cauchy' if for each rational number ε>0 there is a natural number N such that for all natural numbers m, n, if m>N and n>N then -ε < am - an < ε. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.2 n4) | |
A reaction: The sequence is 'Cauchy' if N exists. |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: There is a dedicated contingent who hold that the category of 'categories' is the proper foundation for mathematics. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.3 n7) | |
A reaction: He cites Lawvere (1966) and McLarty (1993), the latter presenting the view as a form of structuralism. I would say that the concept of a category will need further explication, and probably reduce to either sets or relations or properties. |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Zermelo said that for each number n, its successor is the singleton of n, so 3 is {{{null}}}, and 1 is not a member of 3. Von Neumann said each number n is the set of numbers less than n, so 3 is {null,{null},{null,{null}}}, and 1 is a member of 3. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2) | |
A reaction: See Idea 645 - Zermelo could save Plato from the criticisms of Aristotle! These two accounts are cited by opponents of the set-theoretical account of numbers, because it seems impossible to arbitrate between them. |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The structuralist vigorously rejects any sort of ontological independence among the natural numbers; the essence of a natural number is its relations to other natural numbers. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to place the emphasis on ordinals (what order?) rather than on cardinality (how many?). I am strongly inclined to think that this is the correct view, though you can't really have relations if there is nothing to relate. |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A 'system' is a collection of objects with certain relations among them; a 'pattern' or 'structure' is the abstract form of a system, highlighting the interrelationships and ignoring any features they do not affect how they relate to other objects. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.1) | |
A reaction: Note that 'ignoring' features is a psychological account of abstraction, which (thanks to Frege and Geach) is supposed to be taboo - but which I suspect is actually indispensable in any proper account of thought and concepts. |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The thesis that principles of arithmetic are derivable from the laws of logic runs against a now common view that logic itself has no ontology. There are no particular logical objects. From this perspective logicism is a non-starter. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This criticism strikes me as utterly devastating. There are two routes to go: prove that logic does have an ontology of objects (what would they be?), or - better - deny that arithmetic contains any 'objects'. Or give up logicism. |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Term Formalism is the view that mathematics is just about characters or symbols - the systems of numerals and other linguistic forms. ...This will cover integers and rational numbers, but what are real numbers supposed to be, if they lack names? | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.1) | |
A reaction: Real numbers (such as pi and root-2) have infinite decimal expansions, so we can start naming those. We could also start giving names like 'Harry' to other reals, though it might take a while. OK, I give up. |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Game Formalism likens mathematics to chess, where the 'content' of mathematics is exhausted by the rules of operating with its language. ...This, however, leaves the problem of why the mathematical games are so useful to the sciences. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.2) | |
A reaction: This thought pushes us towards structuralism. It could still be a game, but one we learned from observing nature, which plays its own games. Chess is, after all, modelled on warfare. |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The Deductivist version of formalism (sometimes called 'if-thenism') says that the practice of mathematics consists of determining logical consequences of otherwise uninterpreted axioms. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [Hilbert is the source] More plausible than Term or Game Formalism (qv). It still leaves the question of why it seems applicable to nature, and why those particular axioms might be chosen. In some sense, though, it is obviously right. |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Critics commonly complain that the intuitionist restrictions cripple the mathematician. On the other hand, intuitionist mathematics allows for many potentially important distinctions not available in classical mathematics, and is often more subtle. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.1) | |
A reaction: The main way in which it cripples is its restriction on talk of infinity ('Cantor's heaven'), which was resented by Hilbert. Since high-level infinities are interesting, it would be odd if we were not allowed to discuss them. |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: I classify conceptualists according to what they say about properties or concepts. If someone classified properties as existing independent of language I would classify her as a realist in ontology of mathematics. Or they may be idealists or nominalists. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: In other words, Shapiro wants to eliminate 'conceptualist' as a useful label in philosophy of mathematics. He's probably right. All thought involves concepts, but that doesn't produce a conceptualist theory of, say, football. |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A definition of a mathematical entity is 'impredicative' if it refers to a collection that contains the defined entity. The definition of 'least upper bound' is impredicative as it refers to upper bounds and characterizes a member of this set. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The big question is whether mathematics can live with impredicative definitions, or whether they threaten to be viciously circular, and undermine the whole enterprise. |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It is clear from (x)□(x=x) and Leibniz's Law that identity is an 'internal' relation: (x)(y)(x=y ⊃ □x=y). What pairs (w,y) could be counterexamples? Not pairs of distinct objects, …nor an object and itself. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03) | |
A reaction: I take 'internal' to mean that the necessity of identity is intrinsic to the item(s), and not imposed by some other force. |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles) is as self-evident as the law of contradiction. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03) | |
A reaction: This seems obviously correct, as it says no more than that a thing has whatever properties it has. If a difference is discerned, either you have made a mistake, or it isn't identical. |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
Full Idea: I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18) | |
A reaction: I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences. |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
Full Idea: If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property). | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14) | |
A reaction: If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it. |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
Full Idea: We should remind ourselves the 'possible worlds' terminology can always be replaced by modal talk, such as "It is possible that…" | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.15) | |
A reaction: Coming from an originator of the possible worlds idea, this is a useful reminder that we don't have to get too excited about the ontological commitments involved. It may be just a 'way to talk', and hence a tool, rather than a truth about reality. |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
Full Idea: In studying probabilities with dice, we are introduced at a tender age to a set of 36 (miniature) possible worlds, if we (fictively) ignore everything except the two dice. …The possibilities are abstract states of the dice, not physical entities. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.16) | |
A reaction: Interesting for the introduction by the great man of the words 'fictional' and 'abstract' into the discussion. He says elsewhere that he takes worlds to be less than real, but more than mere technical devices. |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Rationalism is a long-standing school that can be characterized as an attempt to extend the perceived methodology of mathematics to all of knowledge. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Sometimes called 'Descartes's Dream', or the 'Enlightenment Project', the dream of proving everything. Within maths, Hilbert's Programme aimed for the same certainty. Idea 22 is the motto for the opposition to this approach. |
339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
Full Idea: No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 29a | |
A reaction: As a neutral observer, I see little sign of it being a blessing, except as a relief from misery. It seem wrong to view such a natural thing as evil, but it is the thing most of us least desire. |
344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
Full Idea: If death is like a night of dreamless sleep it is an advantage, for such nights are very pleasant, and eternity would seem like a single night. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 40d | |
A reaction: Dreamless sleep is only pleasant if being awake is unpleasant. Very quiet days are only pleasant if the active days are horrible. A desire for a totally quiet life is absurd. |
2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
Full Idea: One should never return an injustice nor harm another human being no matter what one suffers at their hands. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49c | |
A reaction: Jesus of Nazareth was not the first person to make this suggestion. |
345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
Full Idea: A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 41d |
346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
Full Idea: One ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49b | |
A reaction: The same as the essential moral teachings of Jesus (see Idea 6288) and Lao Tzu (Idea 6324). The big target is not to be corrupted by the evil of other people. |
341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
Full Idea: Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 30b |
347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
Full Idea: Do I intend to destroy the laws, because the state wronged me by passing a faulty judgement at my trial? | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 50c |
338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates denies the gods, because he says the sun is stone and the moon is earth. | |
From: report of Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]) by Plato - The Apology 26d |