9 ideas
8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.54) | |
A reaction: A lovely concise illustration of the limits of reason. We might distinguish 'rational to us' from 'rational in itself', with only what is true or real aspiring to the latter status. But the latter might be unknowable by us. |
8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It is not plausible to argue from the fact (if it is one) that it is impossible to verify that two things are exactly equal in length to the conclusion that any two things necessarily differ in length. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.58) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple point against anti-realist or verificationist views of the measurement of length. In any case where we can approach perfect precision, but not quite get there, the anti-realist view looks wildly implausible. |
8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible to verify directly that the rotation of the earth would continue if everyone in the universe were sound asleep, yet it is clearly possible that everyone in the universe should at some time be sound asleep. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.59) | |
A reaction: Another beautifully simple argument from Shoemaker against anti-realism (cf. Ideas 8595, 8956). This one is nice because it is so obviously possible, given that everyone able to know of the earth's rotation also seems to need sleep. |
12468 | A state of affairs is only possible if there has been an actual substance to initiate it [Pruss] |
Full Idea: Non-actual states of affairs are possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
From: Alexander R. Pruss (The Actual and the Possible [2002]), quoted by Jonathan D. Jacobs - A Powers Theory of Modality §4.2 | |
A reaction: This is roughly my view. There are far fewer possibilities in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, Horatio. Logical possibilities and fantasy possibilities are not real possibilities. |
8790 | The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12) | |
A reaction: To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason. |
8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If it is possible for there to be changeless intervals of time, then it may seem compatible with my total experience that any number of such intervals, each of them lasting billions of years, should have elapsed since I ate my last meal. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.52) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2792. A nice new sceptical thought! Shoemaker's paper is devoted, successfully I think, to proving that there can indeed by changless intervals of time. |
8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If we found that things always explode after having been red for an hour, we would never suppose that what causes the explosion is simply a thing's having been red for an hour. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.63) | |
A reaction: Shoemaker points out that even Hume says that cause and effect must be 'contiguous', but it clearly means that a simplistic regularity analysis of causation won't work. |
4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: If region A has a year's 'freeze' every three years, region B does it every four years, and C every five years, every sixty years they would all freeze, and there would be no witnesses. The simplest hypothesis is that a year passes with no events. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.247 | |
A reaction: Lovely argument. I definitely vote for there being a year of time with no events, even though it contradicats Einstein and the rest. As usual, we should be doing ontology, but get lured into epistemology. |
8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If region A locally freezes (for one year, observed by the other two regions) every third year, and region B every fourth year, and region B every fifth year, ...then every sixtieth year there will be a total freeze lasting one year. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.56) | |
A reaction: One of the most brilliant thought experiments in modern philosophy!!! He demonstrates that there can be time without change, but also that we must rely on best explanation, and that there is more to ontology than epistemology (let alone semantics). |