Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dialectic of Enlightenment', 'Notes on John Wilkins' and 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
15663 Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of Enlightenment sets the agenda for the subsequent development of critical theory.
     From: report of T Adorno / M Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:07
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
     A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
     A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
12694 Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: (Essence) is the distinct thinkability (cogitabilitas) of anything.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on John Wilkins [1672], A6.2.487-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: A very original remark from the young Leibniz. It is neutral as to whether this is a real feature of objects, or a feature of human mental capacities. Presumably accidental features are thinkable, so 'distinct' is the key word.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20572 De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer]
     Full Idea: De Sade trumpeted far and wide the impossibility of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder.
     From: T Adorno / M Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], p.118)
     A reaction: [They focus on 'Juliette'] This is a big problem for utilitarians, because murdering an unhappy person may maximise happiness. Presumably a maniac could will universal carnage, and thus thwart Kant.