43 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The methodology of metaphysics... is that of arguing to the simplest explanation, without regard to testability. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: I love that! I'd be a bit cautious about 'simplest', since 'everything is the output of an ineffable God' is beautifully simple, and brings the whole discussion to a halt. I certainly think metaphysics goes deeper than testing. String Theory? |
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
Full Idea: Necessary and sufficient conditions are usually expressed by "if and only if" (abbr. "iff"), where "if" is the sufficient condition, and "only if" is the necessary condition. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
A reaction: 'I take my umbrella if and only if it is raining' (oh, and if I'm still alive). There may be other necessary conditions than the one specified. Oh, and I take it if my wife slips it into my car… |
15663 | Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of Enlightenment sets the agenda for the subsequent development of critical theory. | |
From: report of T Adorno / M Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:07 |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
Full Idea: The tradition of the Stoics and Frege says that truth-bearers are propositions, Descartes and the classical empiricist say they are ideas or beliefs, and Ockham and Quine say they are sentences or utterances. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
A reaction: I'm with propositions, which are unambiguous, can be expressed in a variety of ways, embody the 'logical form' of sentences, and could be physically embodied in brains (the language of thought?). |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
Full Idea: The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.2) | |
A reaction: But then when you ask what p means, you have to give the truth-conditions for its assertion, and you find you have to mention the facts after all. |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
Full Idea: The correspondence theory implies displaying an identity or similarity of structure between the contents of thoughts and the way the world is structured, but we seem only to be able to say that the world's structure corresponds to our thoughts. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.2) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this. The structure of the world gives rise to our thoughts. There is an epistemological problem here (big time!), but that doesn't alter the metaphysical situation of what truth is supposed to be, which is correspondence. |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
Full Idea: The coherence theory of truth says that it is a relationship between truth-bearers themselves, that is between propositions or beliefs or sentences. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
A reaction: We immediately begin to wonder how many truth-bearers are required. Two lies can be coherent. It is hard to make thousands of lies coherent, but not impossible. What fixes the critical number. 'All possible propositions' is not much help. |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
Full Idea: Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding to it one or more false beliefs. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.3) | |
A reaction: A simple but rather devastating point. It is the policeman manufacturing a bogus piece of evidence to clinch the conviction, the scientist faking a single observation to fill in the last corner of a promising theory. |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
Full Idea: Deflationism about truth seems to deprive us of any hope of asking genuinely metatheoretical questions, which are the questions that occupy philosophers most of the time. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: This seems like the best reason for moving from deflationism to at least minimalism. Clearly one can talk meaningfully about the success of assertions and theories. You can say a sentence is true, but not assert it. |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
Full Idea: The deflationist view is silent about the fact that our assertions and beliefs are generally made or held for certain reasons. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: The point here must be that I attribute strength to my beliefs, depending on how much support I have for them - how much support for their real truth. I scream "That's really TRUE!" when I have very good reasons. |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
Full Idea: We could compare the status of 'true' with the status of the logical operator 'and' in logic. Once we have explained how it functions to conjoin two propositions, there is not much more to be said about it. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
A reaction: A good statement of the minimalist view. I don't believe it, because I don't believe that truth is confined to language. An uneasy feeling I can't put into words can turn out to be true. Truth is a relational feature of mental states. |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
Full Idea: In logic, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions, ..and the only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible Fregean idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: This has always struck me as correct, given that if you assign T and F in a semantics, they don't have to mean 'true' and 'false', and that you can do very good logic with propositions which you think are entirely false. |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
Full Idea: It is said that deflationism cannot even formulate the principle of bivalence, for 'either p is true or p is false' will amount to the principle of excluded middle, 'either p or not-p'. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably deflationists don't lost any sleep over this - in fact, it looks like a good concise way to state the deflationist thesis. However, excluded middle refers to a proposition (not-p) that was never mentioned by bivalence. Cf Idea 6163. |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
Full Idea: I wish to explore the idea that mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: Categorical dimensions are spatiotemporal relations and other non-causal properties. Ellis defends categorical properties as an aspect of science. The obvious connection seems to be with structuralism in mathematics. Shapiro is sympathetic. |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The category of natural kinds of objects or substances should be regarded simply as a subcategory of the category of the natural kinds of processes. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a new, and interesting, proposal from Ellis (which will be ignored by the philosophical community, as all new theories coming from elderly philosophers are ignored! Cf Idea 12652). A good knowledge of physics is behind Ellis's claim. |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
Full Idea: We may define a physical event as any change of distribution of energy in any of its forms. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to result in an awful lot of events. My own (new this morning) definition is: 'An event is a process which can be individuated in time'. Now you just have to work out what a 'process' is, but that's easier than understanding an 'event'. |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
Full Idea: We may define a physical property as one whose value is relevant, in some circumstances, to how a physical system is likely to act. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: Fair enough, but can we use the same 'word' property when we are discussing abstractions? Does 'The Enlightenment' have properties? Do very simple things have properties? Can 'red' act, if it isn't part of any physical system? |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
Full Idea: I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers. |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Essentialist metaphysics seem to require that there be at least two kinds of properties in nature: dispositional properties (causal powers, capacities and propensities), and categorical ones (spatiotemporal and numerical relations). | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: At last someone tells us what a 'categorical' property is! Couldn't find it in Stanford! Bird and Molnar reject the categorical ones as true properties. If there are six cats, which cat has the property of being six? Which cat is 'three metres apart'? |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and numerical relations can have various causal roles without themselves being instances of causal powers. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: He cites gaps, aggregates, orientations, approaching and receding, as examples of categorical properties which make a causal difference. I would have thought these could be incorporated in accounts of more basic causal powers. |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
Full Idea: To regard properties as sets of individuals, and relations as sets of ordered individuals, is to make a nonsense of the whole idea of discovering a new property or relationship. Sets are defined or constructed, not discovered. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This bizarre view of properties (as sets) drives me crazy, until it dawns on you that they are just using the word 'property' in a different way, probably coextensively with 'predicate', in order to make the logic work. |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A causal power can never be dependent on anything that does not have any causal powers. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Sounds right, though you worry when philosophers make such bold assertions about such extreme generalities. But see Idea 12667. This is, of course, the key argument for saying that causal powers are the bedrock of reality, and of explanation. |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Ellis allows categoricals alongside powers, …to influence the sort of manifestations produced by powers. He lists structures, arrangements, distances, orientations, and magnitudes. | |
From: report of Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009]) by Neil E. Williams - The Powers Metaphysics 05.2 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that all of these could be understood as manifestations of powers. The odd one out is distances, but then space and time are commonly overlooked in every attempt to produce a complete ontology. [also Molnar 2003:164]. |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The causal powers are just a proper subset of the dispositional properties. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 5) | |
A reaction: Sounds wrong. Causal powers have a physical reality, while a disposition sounds as if it can wholly described by a counterfactual claim. It seems better to say that things have dispositions because they have powers. |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
Full Idea: I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8) | |
A reaction: Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be? |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg. |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical necessitation is the relation that holds between things in the world and the things they make true. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: Not sure about that. It implies that it is sentences that have necessity, and he confirms it by calling it 'a semantic relation'. So there are no necessities if there are no sentences? Not the Brian Ellis we know and love. |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary proposition is one that is true in virtue of the essential nature of things. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: It take this to be what Kit Fine argues for, though it tracks back to Aristotle. I also take it to be correct, though one might ask whether there are any other metaphysical necessities, ones not depending on essences. |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
Full Idea: A problem for the Humean theory of motivation is that it is disputed that beliefs are only representational states, which cannot, unlike desires, move us to act. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This is a crucial issue for Humeans and empiricists. Rationalists claim that people act for reasons, so that reasons are intrinsically motivational (like the Form of the Good), and reasons may even be considered direct causes of actions. |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
Full Idea: Belief is said to 'aim at truth', in the sense that beliefs are the kind of mental states that have to be true for the mind to 'fit' the world (where our desires have the opposite 'direction of fit'; the world is supposed to fit our desires). | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: I don't think it is possible to give a plausible definition of belief without mentioning truth. Hume's account of them as thoughts with a funny feeling attached is ridiculous. Thinking is an activity, not a passive state. |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
Full Idea: The 'evidentialists' (such as Locke and Hume) deny, and the 'voluntarists' (such as William James) affirm, that we ought to, or at least may, believe for other reasons than evidential epistemic reasons (e.g. for pragmatic reasons). | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2) | |
A reaction: No need to be black-or-white here. Blatant evidence compels belief, but we may also come to believe by spotting a coherence, without additional evidence. We can also be in a state of trying to believe something. But see 4764. |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism in general is better construed as a certain conception of belief, rather than as a distinctive conception of truth. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.5) | |
A reaction: Which is why aspiring relativists drift towards the pragmatic theory - because they want to dispense with truth (and hence knowledge), and put mere belief in its place. |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
Full Idea: Direct psychological voluntarism about beliefs seems to be false, but we can have an indirect voluntary control on many of our beliefs, by manipulating the states in us that are involuntary and which lead to certain beliefs. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2) | |
A reaction: Very nice! This points two ways - to scientific experiments, which can have compelling outcomes (see Fodor), and to brain-washing, and especially auto-brainwashing (only reading articles which support your favourites theories). What magazines do you take? |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The primary aim of science is to explain what happens, not just to describe it. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This I take to be a good motto for scientific essentialism. Any scientist who is happy with anything less than explanation is a mere journeyman, a servant in the kitchens of the great house of science. |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
Full Idea: For functionalism mental states as roles are second-order properties that have to be realised in various ways in first-order physical properties. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §3.3) | |
A reaction: I take that to be properties-of-properties, as in 'bright red' or 'poignantly beautiful'. I am inclined to think (with Edelman) that mind is a process, not a property. |
20572 | De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer] |
Full Idea: De Sade trumpeted far and wide the impossibility of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder. | |
From: T Adorno / M Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], p.118) | |
A reaction: [They focus on 'Juliette'] This is a big problem for utilitarians, because murdering an unhappy person may maximise happiness. Presumably a maniac could will universal carnage, and thus thwart Kant. |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
Full Idea: There are natural kinds of processes. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Interesting. I am tempted by the view that processes are the most basic feature of reality, since I think of the mind as a process, and quantum reality seems more like processes than like objects. |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Natural kind structures go all the way down to the most basic levels of existence. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Even the bottom level? Is there anything to explain why the bottom level is a kind, given that all the higher kinds presumably have an explanation? |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature must be supposed to be just descriptions of the ways in which things are intrinsically disposed to behave: of how they would behave if they existed as closed and isolated systems. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: I agree with this, and therefore take 'laws of nature' to be eliminable from any plausible ontology (which just contains the things and their behaviour). Ellis tends to defend laws, when he doesn't need to. |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The classical conception of force is an entity that intervenes between a physical cause and its effect, but is not itself a physical cause. I see no reason to believe in forces of this kind. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: The difference of view between Leibniz and Newton is very illuminating on this one (coming this way soon!). Can you either have forces and drop causation, or have causation and drop forces? |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the most important of all multi-valued properties is energy itself. I think a scientific realist must believe that energy exists. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: It's odd that the existence of the most basic thing in physics needs a credo from a certain sort of believer. I have been bothered by notion of 'energy' for fifty years, and am still none the wiser. I'm sure I could be scientific realist without it. |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Cosmologists have a concept of objective simultaneity, which they take to mean something like 'temporally equidistant from the Big Bang'. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: I find this very appealing, when faced with all the relativity theory that tells me there is no such thing as global simultaneity, a claim which I find deeply counterintuitive, but seems to have the science on its side. Bravo. |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The global wavefront that collapses when a light signal from the Big Bang is observed is what most plausibly defines the frontier between past and future. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but it is clearly worth passing on. Of all the deep mysteries, the 'present' time may be the deepest. |