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All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth'' and 'Mathematical Explanation'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
10845 To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Sentences or assertions can be derivately called true, if they succeed in expressing determinate propositions. A sentence can be ambiguous or vague or paradoxical or ungrounded or not declarative or a mere expression of feeling.
     From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.276)
     A reaction: Lewis has, of course, a peculiar notion of what a proposition is - it's a set of possible worlds. I, with my more psychological approach, take a proposition to be a particular sort of brain event.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10847 Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Instances of the truthmaker principle are equivalent to biconditionals not about truth but about the existential grounding of all manner of other things; the flying pigs, or what-have-you.
     From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001])
     A reaction: The question then is what the difference is between 'existential grounding' and 'truth'. There wouldn't seem to be any difference at all if the proposition in question was a simple existential claim.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
10846 Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems to be a version of the correspondence theory of truth, but differs mostly in denying that the correspondence of truths to facts must be one-to-one.
     From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.277)
     A reaction: In other words, several different sentences might have exactly the same truthmaker.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
13230 Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
     Full Idea: Generality is often necessary for capturing the essence of a particular.
     From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.36)
     A reaction: The most powerful features of an entity are probably those which are universal, like intelligence or physical strength in a human. Those characteristics are powerful because they compete with the same characteristic in others (perhaps?).
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13229 Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
     Full Idea: Maybe to deduce a theorem as an instance of a generalization is more explanatory than to deduce it correctly.
     From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.32)
     A reaction: Steiner eventually comes down against this proposal, on the grounds that some proofs are too general, and hence too far away from the thing they are meant to explain.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
13231 Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
     Full Idea: My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to the 'characterizing property' of an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem, where the proof depends on the property. If we substitute a different object, the theory collapses.
     From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.34)
     A reaction: He prefers 'characterizing property' to 'essence', because he is not talking about necessary properties, since all properties are necessary in mathematics. He is, in fact, reverting to the older notion of an essence, as the core power of the thing.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
5994 Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.