10047
|
Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
|
|
Full Idea:
Unfortunately, Russell's new logic, as well as preventing the deduction of paradoxes, also prevented the deduction of mathematics, so he supplemented it with additional axioms, of Infinity, of Choice, and of Reducibility.
|
|
From:
report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §2
|
|
A reaction:
The first axiom seems to be an empirical hypothesis, and the second has turned out to be independent of logic and set theory.
|
21718
|
Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
A defence of the ramified theory of types comes in seeing it as a system of intensional logic which includes the 'no class' account of sets, and indeed the whole development of mathematics, as just a part.
|
|
From:
report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1
|
|
A reaction:
So Linsky's basic project is to save logicism, by resting on intensional logic (rather than extensional logic and set theory). I'm not aware that Linsky has acquired followers for this. Maybe Crispin Wright has commented?
|
18124
|
Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
|
|
Full Idea:
The Vicious Circle Principle says, roughly, that whatever involves, or presupposes, or is only definable in terms of, all of a collection cannot itself be one of the collection.
|
|
From:
report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908], p.63,75) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1
|
|
A reaction:
This is Bostock's paraphrase of Russell, because Russell never quite puts it clearly. The response is the requirement to be 'predicative'. Bostock emphasises that it mainly concerns definitions. The Principle 'always leads to hierarchies'.
|
14330
|
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions.
|
|
From:
David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI)
|
|
A reaction:
It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active.
|
6498
|
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
|
|
Full Idea:
According to D.M. Armstrong and others, when we perceive secondary qualities we are in fact perceiving primary qualities in a confused, indistinct or blurred way.
|
|
From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 270-90) by Howard Robinson - Perception III.1
|
|
A reaction:
This is obviously an attempt to fit secondary qualities into a reductive physicalist account of the mind. Personally I favour Armstrong's project, but doubt whether this strategy is necessary. I just don't think there is anything 'primary' about redness.
|
5690
|
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
|
|
Full Idea:
For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible.
|
|
From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection
|
|
A reaction:
I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible).
|
5493
|
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
|
|
Full Idea:
Armstrong and Lewis said that mental items were defined in terms of typical causes and effects; if, as seems likely, research reveals that a particular causal niche is occupied by a physical state, it follows that pain is a physical state.
|
|
From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.5
|
|
A reaction:
I am not fully convinced of the first step in the argument. It sounds like the epistemology and the ontology have got muddled (as usual). We define mental states as we define electrons, in terms of observed behaviour, but what are they?
|
5994
|
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
|
|
Full Idea:
The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
|
|
From:
report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
|
|
A reaction:
A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.
|