12 ideas
| 15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: To avoid the danger of claiming that dispositions are their own categorical bases, we do better to eschew the alleged distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties altogether. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II) | |
| A reaction: Since I have been unable to form any intuitive notion of what a 'categorical' property is, I like this, though not necessarily for his reason. |
| 15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II) | |
| A reaction: [Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental? |
| 15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A disposition which would straight away vanish if put to the test is called 'finkish'. A finkishly fragile thing is fragile so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I) | |
| A reaction: There are also 'antidotes'. Finks kill the disposition, antidotes kill the effect. These cases are problems for the simple conditional analysis of a disposition - because we never achieved the consequent. |
| 16066 | Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: If you add or take away a pebble, the same number does not remain. If you add to a length or cut off from it, the former measure does not remain. So human beings grow or waste away. Both you and I were, and shall be, other men. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B02), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 03.12 | |
| A reaction: [The original is in dialogue form from a play. The context is a joke about not paying a debt.] Note the early date for this metaphysical puzzle. My new favourite reply is Chrysippus's Idea 16059; identity actually requires change. |
| 15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: 'Backtracking' counterfactual reasoning runs from a counterfactually supposed event to the causal antecedents it would have to have had. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I) | |
| A reaction: Why not call it a 'transcendental' counterfactual? Presumably you go thisworld>> counterfactualevent>> worldneededtocauseit. It conjures up two possible worlds instead of one. |
| 436 | A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: Dog seems very handsome to dog, and ox to ox, and donkey very handsome to donkey, and even pig to pig. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B05), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 442 | Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: Pleasures for mortals are like impious pirates, for the man who is caught by pleasures is immediately drowned in a sea of them. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B44), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
| A reaction: Not all slopes are slippery. Plenty of people hold themselves to strict rules about alcohol or gambling. People have occasional treats. |
| 440 | Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: The hand washes the hand; give something and you may get something. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B30), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 441 | Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B32), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning. | |
| From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out. |
| 439 | God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: Nothing escapes the divine, this you must realise. God himself is our overseer, and nothing is impossible for him. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 443 | Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus] |
| Full Idea: Man has calculation, but there is also the divine logos. But human logos is sprung from the divine logos, and it brings to each man his means of life, and his maintenance. | |
| From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B57), quoted by (who?) - where? |