6237
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Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I)
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A reaction:
The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health.
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6234
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If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III)
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A reaction:
A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings.
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6233
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A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I)
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A reaction:
Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings.
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6235
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Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III)
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A reaction:
Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism.
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20544
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Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift]
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Full Idea:
Isaiah Berlin draws a famous distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of liberty, and argues that the latter should be seen as a wrong turning (because totalitarian regimes have invoked it).
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From:
report of Isaiah Berlin (Two Concepts of Liberty [1958]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 2 'Intro'
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A reaction:
Swift argues against him, saying that positive liberty is not a single concept (it's three), and has aspects that should be defended. I think I'm with Swift on that. Is religious freedom a freedom 'from' something, or a freedom 'to do' something?
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5994
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Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
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From:
report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.
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