Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Two Concepts of Liberty' and 'Essence and Accident'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers

12312	The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
	Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718)
	A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

10937	Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
	Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent.
	From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2
	A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

12308	In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
	Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716)
	A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object

12303	Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
	Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8)
	A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role.

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle

20544	Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift]
	Full Idea: Isaiah Berlin draws a famous distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of liberty, and argues that the latter should be seen as a wrong turning (because totalitarian regimes have invoked it).
	From: report of Isaiah Berlin (Two Concepts of Liberty [1958]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 2 'Intro'
	A reaction: Swift argues against him, saying that positive liberty is not a single concept (it's three), and has aspects that should be defended. I think I'm with Swift on that. Is religious freedom a freedom 'from' something, or a freedom 'to do' something?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

12307	Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
	Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715)
	A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences

12310	Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
	Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717)
	A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals.

27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology

5994	Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
	Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
	From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.