Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston)' and 'Mereology'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
22864 Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is criticism of the influential beliefs that underlie culture, tracking them to their generating conditions and results, and considering their mutual compatibility. This terminates in a new perspective, which leads to new possibilities.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 6:19), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey Intro
     A reaction: [compressed] This would make quite a good manifesto for French thinkers of the 1960s. Foucault could hardly disagree. An excellent idea.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
     Full Idea: There are some proposals for non-well-founded set theory (tolerating cases of self-membership and membership circularities).
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: [He cites Aczel 1988, and Barwise and Moss 1996]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
     Full Idea: While mereology was originally offered with a nominalist viewpoint, resulting in a conception of mereology as an ontologically parsimonious alternative to set theory, there is no necessary link between analysis of parthood and nominalism.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Lesniewski and Leonard-and-Goodman. Do you allow something called a 'whole' into your ontology, as well as the parts? He observes that while 'wholes' can be concrete, they can also be abstract, if the parts are abstract.
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
     Full Idea: It is an open question whether there are any mereological atoms (with no proper parts), and also whether every object is ultimately made up of atoms.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3)
     A reaction: Such a view would have to presuppose (metaphysically) that the divisibility of matter has limits. If one follows this route, then are there only 'natural' wholes, or are we 'unrestricted' in our view of how the atoms combine? I favour the natural route.
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
     Full Idea: It is common in mereology to hold that there is something of which everything is part, but few hold that there is a 'null entity' that is part of everything.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.1)
     A reaction: This comes out as roughly the opposite of set theory, which cannot do without the null set, but is not keen on the set of everything.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
22873 Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Liberalism must become radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to change the system.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 11:287), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Dewey'
     A reaction: Conservative liberals ask what people want, and try to give it to them. Radical liberals ask what people actually need, and try to make it possible. The latter is bound to be a bit paternalistic, but will probably create a better world.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
     Full Idea: The thesis known as 'composition is identity' is that identity is mereological composition; a fusion is just the parts counted loosely, but it is strictly a multitude and loosely a single thing.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.3)
     A reaction: [He cites D.Baxter 1988, in Mind] It is not clear, from this simple statement, what the difference is between multitudes that are parts of a thing, and multitudes that are not. A heavy weight seems to hang on the notion of 'composed of'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
     Full Idea: The word 'part' can used whether it is attached, or arbitrarily demarcated, or gerrymandered, or immaterial, or unextended, or spatial, or temporal.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
     Full Idea: Taking reflexivity as constitutive of the meaning of 'part' amounts to regarding identity as a limit case of parthood.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: A nice thought, but it is horribly 'philosophical', and a long way from ordinary usage and common sense (which is, I'm sorry to say, a BAD thing).
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
     Full Idea: It seems obvious that 'part' stands for a partial ordering, a reflexive ('everything is part of itself'), antisymmetic ('two things cannot be part of each other'), and transitive (a part of a part of a thing is part of that thing) relation.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: I'm never clear why the reflexive bit of the relation should be taken as 'obvious', since it seems to defy normal usage and common sense. It would be absurd to say 'I'll give you part of the cake' and hand you the whole of it. See Idea 10651.
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
     Full Idea: With a basic parthood relation, we can formally define various mereological predicates, such as overlap, underlap, proper part, over-crossing, under-crossing, proper overlap, and proper underlap.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.2)
     A reaction: [Varzi offers some diagrams, but they need interpretation]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
     Full Idea: We might say that sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity, as some entities may differ exclusively with respect to the arrangement of the parts, as when we compare 'John loves Mary' with 'Mary loves John'.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3.2)
     A reaction: Presumably wide dispersal should also prevent parts from fixing wholes, but there is so much vagueness here that it is tempting to go for unrestricted composition, and then work back to the common sense position.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
     Full Idea: Conceivability may well be a guide to possibility, but literary fantasy is by itself no evidence of conceivability.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: Very nice. People who cite 'conceivability' in this context often have a disgracefully loose usage for the word. Really, really conceivable is probably our only guide to possibility.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
22869 Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Knowledge, as an abstract term, is a name for the product of competent enquiries. Apart from this relation, its meaning is so empty that any content or filling may be arbitrarily poured into it.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 12:16), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Knowledge'
     A reaction: What is the criterion of 'competent'? Danger of tautology, if competent enquiry is what produces knowledge.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
22867 The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The quest for certainty is a quest for a peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action costs.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 4:7), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Intro'
     A reaction: This is a characteristic pragmatist account. I think Dewey and Peirce offer us the correct attitude to certainty. It is just not available to us, and can only be a delusion. That doesn't mean we don't know anything, however!
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
22870 No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The attainment of settled beliefs is a progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 12:16), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Knowledge'
     A reaction: A nice pragmatist mantra, but no scientists gets a research grant to prove facts which have been securely established for a very long time. It is neurotic to keep returning to check that you have locked your front door. Dewey introduced 'warranted'.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
22866 Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Mind is primarily a verb. ...Mind never denotes anything self-contained, isolated from the world of persons and things, but is always used with respect to situations, events, objects, persons and groups.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 10:267), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'emerge'
     A reaction: I strongly agree with the idea that mind is a process, not a thing. Certain types of solitary introspection don't seem to quite fit his account, but in general he is right.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
22872 Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Liberalism is committed to …the liberation of individuals so that realisation of their capacities may be the law of their life.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 11:41), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Dewey'
     A reaction: Capacity expression as the main aim of politics is precisely the idea developed more fully in modern times by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. It strikes me as an excellent proposal. Does it need liberalism, or socialism?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
22880 The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The things in civilisation we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:57), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Reconstruct'
     A reaction: Dewey defends liberalism, but he has strong communitarian tendencies. What is the significance of an enduring community losing touch with its own achievements?
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
5994 Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22879 'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
     Full Idea: 'God' represents a unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:29), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Construct'
     A reaction: This seems to have happened when a flawed God like Zeus is elevated to be the only God, and is given supreme power and wisdom.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
22877 We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
     Full Idea: One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion (so intense as to be religious) to intelligence as a force in social action.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:53), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Intro'
     A reaction: An interesting thought that religious emotions such as devotion are so distinctive that they can be treated as valuable, even in the absence of belief. He seems to be advocating Technocracy.
22878 Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]
     Full Idea: There is only a multitude of religions …and the differences between them are so great and so shocking that any common element that can be extracted is meaningless.
     From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:7), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Construct'
     A reaction: Religion is for Dewey what a game was for Wittgenstein, as an anti-essentialist example. I would have thought that they all involved some commitment to a realm of transcendent existence.