25 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: My conviction is that philosophy is a priori if it is anything. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], Pref) | |
A reaction: How about knowledge of a posteriori necessities, such as the length of a metre, known by observation of the standard metre in Paris? |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: If one never in fact grasps any necessary connections between anything, it is hard to see what reasoning could possible amount to. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.3) |
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
Full Idea: The objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested. | |
From: Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934], p.22), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.4 | |
A reaction: Does this mean that objectivity is the same as consensus? A bunch of subjective prejudiced fools can reach a consensus. And in the middle of that bunch there can be one person who is objecfive. Sounds wrong. |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The epistemic authority of coherence cannot itself be established by appeal to coherence. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7 n50) | |
A reaction: The standard approach amongs modern philosophers (following, I think, Kripke) is to insist on 'intuition' as basic, despite all its problems. I have no better suggestion. |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: While necessity and possibility are interdefinable concepts, it is the idea of a possible world or situation which is intuitively primary. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §1.3) |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Moderate rationalism preserves a priori justification, but rejects the idea that it is infallible. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.1) |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Criteria or rules do not somehow apply to themselves. They must be judged by the sort of rational insight or intuition that the rationalist is advocating. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §5.2) |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: A proposition will count as being justified a priori as long as no appeal to experience is needed for the proposition to be justified - once it is understood. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §1.2) | |
A reaction: Could you 'understand' that a square cannot be circular without appeal to experience? I'm losing faith in the pure a priori. |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Moderate empiricists try unsuccessfully to explain a priori justification by means of analyticity, and radical empiricist attempts to dispense with a priori justification end in nearly total scepticism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.1) | |
A reaction: My working theory is neither of the above. Because we can abstract from the physical world, we can directly see/experience generalised (and even necessary) truths about it. |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: A priori justification can vary in degree. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.5) | |
A reaction: This idea, which I trace back at least to Russell, seems to me one of breakthrough ideas in modern thought. It means that a priori knowledge can be reconnected with a posteriori knowledge. |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The attempt to prove physical statements on the basis of sensory evidence is defeated by the problem of induction. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.6) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's use of the word 'prove', which would be a pretty forlorn hope. Insofar as experience proves anything, fully sensing a chair proves its existence. |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: An externalist theory of epistemic justification or warrant need not involve the possession by the believer of anything like a reason for thinking that their belief is true. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7) | |
A reaction: That is the problem with externalism. If the believer does not have a reason, then why would they believe? Externalists are interesting on justification, but daft about belief. Why do I believe I know something, when I can't recall how I learnt it? |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: If externalism is the final story, we have no reason to think that any of our beliefs are true, which amounts to a very strong and intuitively implausible version of scepticism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7) | |
A reaction: A very good point. I may, like a cat, know many things, with good external support, but as soon as I ask sceptical questions, I sink without trace if I lack internal reasons. |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
Full Idea: Popper implies that we should be giving Nobel Prizes to scientists who use severe tests to show us what the world is not like! | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 2 | |
A reaction: A lovely simple point. The refuters are important members of the scientific team, but not the leaders. |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
Full Idea: According to Popper, falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. | |
From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.3 | |
A reaction: If I propose something which might be falsified in a hundred years, is it science NOW? Suppose my theory appeared to be falsifiable, but (after much effort) it turned out not to be? Suppose I just see a pattern (like quark theory) in a set of facts? |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
Full Idea: Popper's mistake is to hold that disconfirmation and elimination work exclusively through refutation. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 05 'Explanation' | |
A reaction: The point is that we reject hypotheses even if they have not actually been refuted, on the grounds that they don't give a good explanation. I agree entirely with Lipton. |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
Full Idea: In Popper's sense of the word 'falsify', whereby an observation statement falsifies a hypothesis only by being logically inconsistent with it, nothing can ever falsify a probabilistic or statistical hypothesis, which is therefore unscientific. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.5 | |
A reaction: In general, no prediction can be falsified until the events occur. This seems to be Aristotle's 'sea fight' problem (Idea 1703). |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
Full Idea: It is a feature of Popper's philosophy that when the going gets tough, induction is quietly called upon to help out. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This appears to be the central reason for the decline in Popper's reputation as the saviour of science. It would certainly seem absurd to say that you know nothing when you have lots of verification but not a glimmer of falsification. |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Popper's principles are roughly that one theory is superior to another if it has greater empirical content, if it can account for the successes of the first theory, and if it has not been falsified (unlike the first theory). | |
From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science I.6 |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Inductive explanations must be conceived of as something stronger than mere Humean constant conjunction; …anything less than this will not explain why the inductive evidence occurred in the first place. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §7.7) |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
Full Idea: According to Popper, induction is a dispensable concept, a myth. It does not exist. There is no such thing. | |
From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is a nice bold summary of the Popper view - that falsification is the underlying rational activity which we mistakenly think is verification by repeated observations. Put like this, Popper seems to be wrong. We obviously learn from experiences. |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
Full Idea: If Popper follows Hume in abandoning induction, there is no way in which he can justify the claims that there is growth of scientific knowledge and that science is a rational activity. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science III.3 |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: I assume that the contents of thought can be accounted for by appeal to just two general sorts of ingredient - properties (including relations) and indexicals. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §6.7) | |
A reaction: I don't accept that relations are a type of properties. Since he does not include objects or substances, I take it that he considers objects to be bundles of properties. |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would be better described as the thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning and belief. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.5) | |
A reaction: Not necessarily. It is not incoherent to believe that the target people have a coherent and stable system of meaning and belief, but finding its translation indeterminate because it is holistic, and rooted in a way of life. |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |
Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning. | |
From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out. |