Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Explanation in Mathematics'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

6855	Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
	A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument

6856	Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
	A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

13166	Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
	Full Idea: Essences and essential properties do not seem to be useful in mathematical contexts, since all mathematical truths are regarded as necessary (though Kit Fine distinguishes between essential and necessary properties).
	From: Paolo Mancosu (Explanation in Mathematics [2008], §6.1)
	A reaction: I take the proviso in brackets to be crucial. This represents a distortion of notion of an essence. There is a world of difference between the central facts about the nature of a square and the peripheral inferences derivable from it.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception

6857	An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
	A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.

27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology

5994	Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
	Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
	From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.