Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Reply to Professor Frankena' and 'Notes on Logic'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
     Full Idea: In 1913 Wittgenstein was explicit that there are both positive and negative facts.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notes on Logic [1913], B7) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 47 'Mole'
     A reaction: This is a prelude to the Tractatus, in which negative facts are denied in T1.11 (and in a 1919 letter), but then affirmed in T2.06.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
     Full Idea: Moral judgements are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they give reasons for acting only in conjunction with interests and desires.
     From: Philippa Foot (Reply to Professor Frankena [1975], p.177)
     A reaction: This is a splendid claim, which points to a more sensibly naturalistic ethics. There seem to be occasions for moral behaviour where I have no interests or desires, such as when a stranger asks me for a favour and I'm feeling tired.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.