Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Philosophy as a way of life' and 'On 'Physics''

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
     Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7)
     A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
     Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3)
     A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], I.18), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
     A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who base their ontology on first-order classical logic. The more austere reading of that makes the accidents into sets of substances, so it's just substances. All the non-substance stuff cries out for recognition.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
     A reaction: This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.
Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
     Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1)
     A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four major disputes in classical cosmology were whether the cosmos is 'open' or 'closed', whether it is explained mechanistically or teleologically, whether it is alive or mere matter, and whether or not it has a beginning.
     From: report of T.M. Robinson (Classical Cosmology (frags) [1997]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice summary. The standard modern view is closed, mechanistic, inanimate and non-eternal. But philosophers can ask deeper questions than physicists, and I say we are entitled to speculate when the evidence runs out.